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CHAPTER 10 
Commercial Law 
RALPH E. DUERRE AND STEPHEN E. MOORE• 
§10.1. Security interest: Self-help repossession of collateral: Constitu-
tionality: Due process. The case of Boland v. Esst!x County Bank b 
Trust Co.t presented the question of whether self-help repossession of 
collateral upon a default by the debtor without notice to the debtor and 
an opportunity for the debtor to be heard violates the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The 
issue, which Judge Garrity called "one of the liveliest on the current 
judicial scene,''ll emanates from the rationale of cases such as Fuentt!s v. 
Shevin,8 Schneider v. Margossian• and Bay State Harness Horse Racing b 
Breeding Association, Inc. v. PPG Industries, Inc.& Resolution of the 
question, however, rests not only upon a determination of whether due 
process forbids self-help repossession without notice and an opportunity 
to be heard, but initially whether there is sufficient "state action" arising 
in connection with self-help repossession so as to bring the due process 
clause into play. 
The issue of whether self-help repossession involves ''state action" has 
been the subject of extensive litigation in the past three years. At the 
time of this writing, twelve federal district courts have upheld the con-
stitutionality of the remedy, mainly on the basis of finding a lack of state 
involvement, while five federal district courtse have found that the rem-
edy fails to pass constitutional muster. The issue has also been litigated in 
various state courts with various results. Only the Courts of Appeals for 
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have rendered decisions on the issue, both 
holding that self-help repossession was not violative of the due process 
clause because of the lack of significant state involvement.' 
• STEPHEN E. MooRE is a partner in the firm of Warner Be Stackpole, Boston. 
RALPH E. DVERRE is an associate in the firm of Warner Be Stackpole, Boston. 
§lo.I. 1 1161 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 19711). 
2 Id. at 919. 
8 407 u.s. 67 (1972). 
f !1(9 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972). 
15 ll65 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mus. 197!1). 
6 Adams v. Southern Callfornia First Nat1 Bank, [1969-197!1 Transfer Binder] CCH 
Secured Trans. Guide, 52.216 (9th Cir. 197!1). 
T Hampton v. Bank of California, (1969-197!1 Transfer Binder] CCH Secured Trans. 
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The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state from taking the prop-
erty of any person without due process of law. The required state action 
was found to exist in the Fuentes, Schneider and Bay State cases, either 
after full discussion or sub silentio, because the remedies and procedures 
challenged were created and authorized solely by legislative enactments 
of the various states. The unique question presented in the self-help re-
possession cases is whether state action can be found where the parties 
privately provide the remedy by the terms of their contract and where 
no state official or ag~IJ.t becQmes involved in the act of repossession. 
The various c:aSes consolidated in the Boland action involved the de-
fendants' motions td' dismiss for failure·· to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. For the purposes of the motion, the COUrt assumed 
that the plaintiffs in each of the cases were in default under their con-
tracts and that the defendant Creditors had repossessed the automobiles 
without notice to or the consent of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs contended 
that state action existed in the self-help repossession procedures because of 
the enactment of the various state statutes& (section 9-508 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code is representative of such statutes and will be referred 
to herein in lieu of the citation of each of such statutes) which "authorize" 
the creditor to repossess the property in the event of default by the 
debtor, because such statutes significantly enoourage and regulate the 
method of repossession and because such statutes expand the common 
law rights of creditors by (I) permitting the creditor to enter upon the 
premises of the debtor without an express contractual authorization and 
(2) permitting the creditor both to repossess and to sue for a deficiency 
where under the common law the creditor was required to elect between 
his remedies. The defendants countered by arguing that the right and 
authority to repossess emanated. from the security agreement, which was a 
private contract between consenting parties, and that the state statutes 
cited above, rather than authorizing and encouraging repossession, in 
fact severely limit the procedures· which the creditor could undertake in 
accomplishing a :repossession. 
The court, although indicating that the issue was close, joined the 
minority of federal district courts and held that the state was significantly 
involved in the act of self-help repossession." The court adopted the 
plaintiffs' argument that the enactment of section 9-508 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code· and the .related statutes. significantly encouraged self. 
Guide • 52.216 (9th Cir. 197S): Biebel Optical Laboratories. Inc. v. Marquette Nat1 
Bank, 4 CCH Secured Trans. Guide 1J 52,220 (8th Cir. 1975). 
8 !161 F. Supp. at 919. G.L c. 106, 1§9-505, 9-504 (repossession and redemption rights): 
G.L c. 255, 1§151, 15J (repossession and redemption rights with tapect to mortgages, 
conditional .sales and pledges of personal pro~y): G.L c:. 255B, 1§20A, 20B (re-
possession and redemption with tapect to motor vebides): G.L c. 255D, 1§21, 22 
(repossession and redemption of retail installment sales and .services). 
II !161 F. Supp •. at 921. 
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help repossession and made the changes in the common law indicated 
above. The court was impressed by the extensive regulation of finance 
companies set forth in the related statutes and indicated that the pro-
visions of section 9-508 and the related statutes set forth a policy which 
was simply carried over into the terms oi security agreements. The court 
did not indicate its view as to whether creditors derived their authority 
to repossess from private contracts or otherwise prior to the enactment of 
the statutes in question, but stated that since the adoption of the statutes, 
all repossessions have been made under their color.10 
The court also indicated its belief that creditors frequently employed 
state officials, such as police officers, in connection with repossession and 
that the plaintiffs' actions should not be dismissed until the plaintiffs had 
an opportunity to discover the extent to which such state officials might 
be involved in the act of self-help repossession.11 
An interesting aspect of this case was presented by one of the cases 
which involved a repossession under a Connecticut security agreement. 
The federal District Court for Connecticut in Shirley v. State National 
Bank12 had determined on April 2, 1973 that self-help repossession was 
constitutional. The court noted that one of the cases before it was 
governed by Connecticut law, and that ordinarily the federal District 
Court in Massachusetts would adopt as its interpretation of Connecticut 
law an interpretation rendered by the District Court sitting in Connecti-
cut. The court indicated, however, that it could find no substantial 
difference between the law of the two states on the issue and that the 
District Court for Connecticut apparently was unaware of the changes in 
the common law effected by the adoption of section 9-503. Therefore, the 
court ignored the Shirley holding and found "state action" to exist in 
both the Massachusetts and Connecticut cases.1a 
The issue of "state action" has not been finally resolved in this 
country despite the attention of the many state courts, federal district 
courts and the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. It 
would appear that the issue is of a nature to require determination by 
the United States Supreme Court. Although any suggestion of what action 
that Court may take is speculative, one must consider that Fuentes was a 
four-to-three decision, Justices Powell and Rehnquist having not been 
seated in time to join in the consideration of the case. One must also 
consider the implications of the fact that the Supreme Court did find a 
lack of state involvement in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,14 a case follow-
ing right on the heels of Fuentes. The activity in this area must be 
10 Id. at 920-21. 
n Id. at 921. 
12 [New Developments Transfer Binder] CCH Secured Trans. Rep.~ 52,210 (D. Conn. 
1973). 
13 361 F .Supp. at 921. 
14 407 u.s. 163 (1972). 
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followed closely by the bar during the next few years until a final de-
termination is rendered. 
In Massachusetts, counsel should also be familiar with chapter 629 of 
the Acts of 1975, discussed in section 10.16 of this chapter, which im-
poses new restrictions on the ability of the secured creditor to employ self-
help repossession. 
§10.2. R.eal estate attachment: Constitutionality of Massachusetts 
statutory procedures: Due process. The case of Bay State Harness Horse 
Racing h Breeding Association, Inc. v. PPG Industries, Inc.1 concerned 
a suit brought by the plaintiff landowners to determine the constitution-
ality of the Massachusetts statutory real estate attachment procedures 
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. The owners of the attached real estate sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief against continued enforcement of G.L. 
c. 225, §§42, 62-66 on the ground that those provisions failed to provide 
for notice to defendants to be heard prior to the attachment of their 
real property. Under chapter 225, real property liable to be taken on 
execution is subject to attachment upon the original writ in any action 
in which a debt or damages is recoverable.2 The statutes authorize the 
attaching officer to make the at~nt upon the original writ and to 
record a certified copy of the original writ, together with his return as it 
relates to the attachment, in the appropriate registry of deeds.a No notice 
of the attachment is required to be given the defendant prior to the mak-
ing of the attachment and, of course, the defendant has no opportunity to 
be heard in a judicial proceeding prior to the attachment. 
Relying primarily upon Fuentes v. Shevin4 and Schneider v. Margas-
sian,'' the court held that the real estate attachment statutes do violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment because of the absence of procedures designed 
to give the landowner notice and an opportunity to be heard in a judicial 
proceeding prior to the attachment of his real property. 
The three judge federal courts declined to certify to the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court the question of whether said court would con-
strue the applicable statutes as impliedly requiring notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard.' The determination not to certify was made by the 
court because of the desirability of a prompt adjudication of the issue and 
the remoteness of the possibility of a confticting state decision in light of 
the Schneider decision. a 
§1o.2. 1 865 F. Supp. 1299 (D. M1118. 1975). 
ll G.L c. 22!1, §42. 
a G.L c. 22!1, §§42, 6!1. 
4 407 u.s. 67 (19'12). 
I !149 F. Supp. 741 (D. M•. 1972). 
8 Coffin, Circuit Judge, Murray Be Freedman, District Judges. 
T !165 F. Supp. at 1!10!1. 
lid. 
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The primary issues before the court were whether a real estate attach-
ment constituted a "deprivation of property" as required for a violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and whether, if such constituted a depriva-
tion of property, there were overriding governmental or societal consid-
erations which would justify the deprivation without notice and bring 
the procedure safely within the ambit of due process. With respect to the 
issue of whether a "deprivation of property" existed, the court stated that 
the interest created by the attachment operates as a superior interest 
against subsequent purchasers, mortgagees or attaching creditors, 
and thus restricts the owner's ability to sell or mortgage the property 
at its full value.9 
The court held that the restriction on the owner's ability to sell or mort-
gage the property at its full value constituted a significant deprivation of 
property, even though the same (1) was temporary in nature, (2) did not 
take possession of the property from the landowner, and (3) did not 
restrict his physical use of the property.1o The court distinguished the 
case of Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick,U a 1971 case where the federal 
district court in Connecticut held constitutional Connecticut real estate 
attachment statutes, which were similar to those of Massachusetts, on the 
basis that the Black Watch case was decided prior to Fuentes and relied 
upon a narrow interpretation of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.12 The 
court noted that the narrow interpretation of Sniadach, as applying the 
due process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard only 
to certain types of property which were deemed to be necessities, such as 
wages and welfare benefits, had been eliminated by Fuentes, thereby mak-
ing Black Watch of little value as a controlling precedent. 
The court next considered the standards set forth in Fuentes to deter-
mine whether there were extraordinary circumstances justifying the 
postponing of notice and a hearing. The court noted, without extensive 
discussion, that the statutory scheme permitting such attachments indi-
cated no overriding governmental or societal interests, and it therefore 
held that the procedures authorized therein were subject to normal due 
process requirements. Following its discussion of the issues, the court 
granted the plaintiffs' prayer for declaratory relief-that is, that the statu-
tory real estate attachment procedures were violative of the due process 
clause-and granted the plaintiffs' prayer for injunctive relief against the 
continued enforcement of the statutes by the defendant Registrar of Deeds 
for Norfolk County. In connection with the issuance of the injunction the 
court held that the Registrar was acting as a state officer in the perfor-
9 Id. at 1305. 
10 Id. at 1304-05. 
11 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971). 
12 895 u.s. 337 (1969). 
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mance of his duties under the applicable statutes and was, therefore, sub-
ject to injunctive orders of the court. 
As has been traditional in the line of cases attacking long-standing 
statutory creditors' remedies under the due process clause, the court 
limited the effect of its judgment to the parties before it (including certain 
other parties in related cases in the Massachusetts Federal District Court 
where the constitutionality of the real estate attachment procedures had 
been challenged) and to prospective enforcement only from August 7, 
1973, the date of the filing of the order.13 This course was taken to avoid 
the uncertainty and doubt that a retroactive order would have cast upon 
the validity of all prior attachments of real estate. The "prospective only" 
effect of the court's order, however, effectively bars a defendant whose 
real estate was attached prior to August 7, 1973, from attacking the 
validity of the attachment unless he had commenced his action in the 
federal district court prior to August 7. The lesson of the "prospective 
only" rulings is that defendant's counsel should not delay in bringing 
their client's cases to bar wherever a challenge against a similar statu-
tory procedure is to be made on due process grounds. To wait until 
another has borne the burden of 'establishing precedent can leave one's 
client with an unenforceable constitutional right. 
Although there were substantial issues considered and decided in this 
action, the decision holding real estate attachments unconstitutional. ap-
pears generally to be consistent with the Sniadach, Fuentes and Schneider 
cases. It should be noted, however, that this action may have gone, sub 
silentio, beyond those cases in that this was not a consumer action, but 
one between two commercial enterprises. No discussion of this aspect of 
the matter appears in the decision. 
Although no amendments to the applicable statutes have been adopted 
by the Massachusetts Legislature, various courts within the Common-
wealth have adopted procedures whereby a plaintiff may apply for per-
mission to attach real property.14 The applicant must give notice of 
the application and the date of the hearing upon the application to the 
defendant. The court must find that there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the plaintiff recover in an amount greater or equal to the amount of 
attachment if there is jurisdiction over the defendant.lll The ex parte 
approval may be secured upon findings that the defendant is not subject 
to personal jurisdiction of the court; upon findings that there is a clear 
danger that the defendant will remove his property from the Common-
wealth or convey it if notified in advance; or upon findings that there is 
immediate danger that the defendant will damage, destroy or waste the 
13 365 F. Supp. at 1307. 
14 Rule 3:27 of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. This rule is similar to Rule 
4.1 of the Mass. R. Civ. Proc., effective July 1, 1974 and will be supplanted by Rule 4.1. 
See 18 Boston Bar J. 37-38 (Feb. 1974). 
lli Rule 3:27(2) of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 
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attached property.16 The plaintiff must "justify" the ex parte order if 
questioned by the defendant at any point.17 
§10.3. Status of tax escrow accounts in Massachusetts. Joining a 
national trend, mortgagors in Massachusetts are seeking to require that 
their mortgagees account for any profits realized by the latter's investment 
of amounts paid periodically to them toward real estate taxes on the 
mortgaged property.1 In the case of Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Savings 
Bank,2 the essential allegations of plaintiffs' bill maintained that they 
owned real property which was mortgaged to the defendant bank and 
that the bank required the mortgagors to make monthly payments to 
the bank of one-twelfth the annual municipal real estate taxes assessed 
upon the property. The plaintiffs further alleged those tax payments 
were commingled with the assets of the bank and invested for profit. On 
the theory that the bank was holding the payments in the capacity of an 
"escrowee," the plaintiffs primarily prayed for an accounting of the 
earnings and an order that the bank has no beneficial interest in the 
tax moneys and that any profits realized belong to the plaintiffs.s The 
bank demurred to the bill on the grounds that it failed to state a cause 
of action and that there was no basis for equitable relief. The superior 
court sustained the bank's demurrer without leave to amend and the 
plaintiffs appealed. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the plaintiffs' bill alleged 
sufficient facts to state a cause of action4 and suggested that the right 
to relief depended upon "the relationship created between the plaintiffs 
and the defendant by the mortgages, loans, and payment of tax install-
ments."11 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the legislative 
framework surrounding the transaction authorized the relief of an ac-
counting by the bank.6 Although the court concluded that "the statutes 
neither require nor prohibit the payment of interest to mortgagors on 
16 Rule 3:27(5). 
17 Rule 3:27(6). 
§10.3. 1 See generally, Comment, Payment of Interest on Mortgage Escrow Accounts: 
Judicial and Legislative Developments, 23 Syracuse L. Rev. 845 (1972); Comment, Apply-
ing Federal Antitrust Law to Banking Services-Noninterest-Bearing Mortgage Escrow 
Accounts, 25 Maine L. Rev. 315 (1973); Annot., 50 A.L.R.!Id 697 (1973). 
2 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 49, 291 N.E.2d 609. 
a Id. at 49-50, 291 N.E.2d at 611. 
4 Id. at 59-60, 291 N.E.2d at 616. 
II Id. at 51, 291 N.E.2d at 611. 
6 Id. at 52-53, 291 N.E.2d at 612-13. G.L. c. 167, §58 grants "the defendant bank ... 
the statutory rights to require tax payments as part of the mortgage and loan agree-
ments." 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 52, 291 N.E.2d at 612. In fact, G.L. c. 168, §35 permits 
banks to include tax payments in the mortgage or loan agreements. G.L. c. 167, §58 also 
authorizes the defendant bank to invest tax payments until due. However, §58 does not 
"indicate which of the parties ... had the right to any profit returned upon such invest-
ments [of tax payments]." 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 52-53, 291 N.E.2d at 612-13. 
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tax deposits,'"' it went on to analyze the relationship between mortgagor 
and mortgagee as one of agreement or contract, and stated that "particu-
lar mortgage and loan agreements may, however, give rise to additional 
obligations on the part of mortgagor or mortgagee."s If such additional 
obligations are not imposed by the express language of the mortgage and 
loan agreements, II they may be by implication of the language used or con-
struction of the agreements.1o 
According to plaintiffs' bill the particular mortgages in question recite 
"an obligation on the part of the mortgagors to make periodic payments 
of municipal real estate taxes in monthly installments •.. estimated by 
the defendant."ll The bill also states that the defendant in October of 
each year remitted payments to the tax collector in satisfaction of the 
real estate taxes assessed upon the plaintiffs for the pertinent year. 
The question presented was whether the above were sufficient allegations 
of a relationship that could provide a basis for an accounting.12 In de-
termining that the plaintiffs' bill stated a cause of action, the court 
suggested that the plaintiffs' case could be grounded on a common law 
trust relationship which would give rise to fiduciary obligations.1a In the 
court's language, "[w]here the mortgagor pays funds to a bank with an 
expressed purpose that the funds shall be used for a particular purpose, 
then the funds may be deemed to be held in trust."H. The court accepted 
the averments in the bill as true and apparently derived factual conclu-
sions from the averred facts. As a prologue to its discussion of the trust 
theory, the court stated: 
'I 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 54, 291 N.E.2d at 61!1. 
8 Id., citing Bennett v. Worcester County Nat'l Bank, !150 Mass. 64, 21!1 N.E.2d 254 
(1966). 
II See Bennett v. Worcester County Nat'l Bank, !150 Mass. 64, 21!1 N.E.2d 254 (1966), 
and Hooper v. Mayo, 298 Mass. 411, 10 N.E.2d 249 (19!17), where the "additional obliga· 
tiona" were imposed by express agreement between the parties. · 
10 See Sears v. First Fed. Sav. &: Loan Ass'n, 1 Ill. App. !ld 621, 627, 275 N.E.2d !100, 
!10!1 (1971). 
11 197!1 Mass Adv. Sh. at 54, 291 N.E.2d at 614. 
12 Id., 291 N.E.2d at 615. 
18 Id. at 55-56, 291 N.E.2d at 614. See also 2 A. Soott, The Law of Trusts 1§164, 170 
(!ld ed, 1967). Other oourts have oonaidered this to be a "well settled" doctrine of com-
mon law. See, e.g., Andrew v. Union Sav. Bank&: Trust Co., 220 Iowa 712, 715, 26!1 N.W. 
495, 497 (19!15). 
14 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 55, 291 N.E.2d at 614, citing 1 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts 
§24 at 192 (!ld ed. 1967); Andrew v. Union Sav. Bank &: Trust Co., 220 Iowa 712, 715, 26!1 
N.W. 495, 497 (19!15); Comment, Payments of Interest on Mortgage Escrow Accounts: 
Judicial and Legislative Developments, 2!1 Syracuse L Rev. 845, 852 (1972). The court 
overstates the doctrine aa presented in Scott; the precise language of such doctrine was 
later quoted by the oourt: "'[w]here the owner of property transfers it to another with 
a direction to transfer it to ••• a third person, this may be a sufJident manifestation of 
an intention to create a trust.' " 19711 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 55, 291 N •. E.2d at 614. Compare 
Ctn1Jmter with Andrew v. Union Sav. Bank &: Trust Co., 220 Iowa 712, 715, 26!1 N.W. 
495, 497 (19!15). 
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The bill designates the installments paid to the bank as "real estate 
taxes." We think that it is clear from the bill that the tax payments 
were designated by the mortgagors for a specific putpose, namely to 
pay the real estate taxes.111 
This language, read in light of the court's statement of the common 
law doctrine quoted above, is confusing. It is unclear whether the court 
intended to conclude as a matter of fact or matter of law1a that the "desig-
nation" of periodic payments to defendant bank as "real estate taxes" is a 
sufficiently "expressed putpose" ("namely to pay real estate taxes"1") so 
that a trust is "deemed" to have been created. If the court's dictum is to 
be read as applicable to the later determination of the merits, then the 
Supreme Judicial Court will be the only court to have adopted the 
trust theory as a result of this type of action.1s Despite the confusion 
created by the language of the court regarding conclusions of fact, the 
superior court still must determine on remand all factual questions;19 
the superior court must now ascertain "the intention of the parties 
[as] 'manifested by their words and conduct and the end to be accom-
plished' "2o so as to determine whether a trust was created.21 
111 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 55, 291 N.E.2d at 614. 
18 To reiterate the court's language: "[w]e think it is clear ••• .'' Id. 
1T A rationale supporting the quantum leap made by the court, i.e., from designation 
as "real estate taxes" to designation of the "specific purpose, namely to pay the real 
estate taxes," may be inferred from the language of G.L. c. 168, §35 and G.L. c. 167, 
§58 and their various amendments. See 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 51·53, 291 N.E.2d at 611·13. 
18 See, e.g., Sears v. First Fed. Sav. Be Loan Ass'n, I Ill. App. 3d 621, 275 N.E.2d 300 
(1971); Umdenstock v. American Mortgage 8c Inv. Co., 363 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. 
Okla. 1973); Zelickman v. Bell Fed. Sav. 8c Loan Ass'n, Ill Ill. App. 3d 578, 301 N.E.2d 
47 (1st Dist. 1973); Richman v. Security Sav. 8c Loan Ass'n, 57 Wis. 2d 358, 204 N.W.2d 
511 (1973); Brooks v. Valley Nat'1 Bank, No. C-254842 (Super. Ct., Maricopa County, 
Ariz., May 8, 1973): Cale v. American Nat'1 Bank, No. 901,760 (Common Pleas, Cuyahoga 
County, Ohio, Noventber 29, 1973). 
19 "Our holding, limited to the present record, is simply that there are sufficient aver-
ments in the plaintiffs' bill to state a cause of action." 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 59-60, 291 
N.E.2d at 616. 
20 Id. at 55, 291 N.E.2d at 614. An express trust is created "only if the settlor properly 
manifests an intention to create a trust ••• .'' I A. Scott, The Law of Trusts §23 at 191 
(3d eel. 1967); a resulting trust arises where "circumstances indicate the absence of an 
intention to give the beneficial interest to the person in whom the legal title to the 
property is vested.'' 5 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts § 404.1 at 3213 (3d ed. 1967). In each 
case the court must ascertain "the intention of the parties [as] 'manifested by their 
words and conduct and the end to be accomplished.' " 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 55, 291 
N.E.2d at 614. 
21 Determination of this issue may have to await some time in that plaintiffs amended 
their bill so as to represent that "class of persons consisting of Massachusetts real estate 
owners who were or are mortgagors of one of the defendant banks ••• and, during the 
last six years, have each made tax escrow account payments to one of the said banks 
pursuant to mortgage instruments which required the mortgagors to make such pay· 
ments in monthly installments equal to one-twelfth of the municipal real estate taxes" 
(Final Amended Complaint, Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Sav. Bank, at 1) and to 
9
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§10.4. Nonsigner provision of the BO-Called Fair Trade Law declared 
unconstitutional. In the case of Corning Glass Works v. Ann & Hope 
of Danvers, Inc.,1 the nonsigner provisions of the Fair Trade Law2 were 
held unconstitutional, thus overruling General Electric Co. v. Kimball 
Jewelers, Inc.a The court joins "most of the courts of other states"4 that 
have "resolve[d] constitutional doubts"G against the validity of fair trade 
laws.e Challenged in this case on several constitutional grounds, the 
nonsigner provision survived repeated attacks before the court as viola-
tions of due process and equal protection,7 and as an unconstitutional 
exercise of police power;8 it weakened when ruled to be "a delegation of 
include as party defendants "all of the savings banks and co-operative banks lawfully 
incorporated under the laws of the Commonwealth," (id. at 2) thereby creating addi-
tional preliminary issues of service of process, venue and standing to represent the above 
class. 
§10.4. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 575, 294 N.E.2d 354. This case is treated more extensively 
in a student comment in §10.15 infra. 
2 G.L, c. 93, §114A-14D. The nonsigner provision is contained in §14B, which pro-
vides: 
Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity 
at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the 
preceding section, whether the person so advertising, offering for sale or selling is 
or is not a party to such contract, is hereby declared to constitute unfair competition 
and to be actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby. Any person 
advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity as aforesaid shall, in addition, 
forfeit through civil process to the commonwealth the sum of fifty dollars. 
8 353 Mass. 665, 152 N.E.2d 652 (1956). The General Electric case was overruled to 
the limited extent that the court in that case held that "[t]he fair trade law does not 
constitute an unlawful delegation of power to the owner of the trademark or brand." 
Id. at 677, 132 N.E.2d at 659. 
' 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 580, 589, 294 N.E.2d at 357, 365; 
II Id. at 580, 294 N.E.2d at 357. 
6 It is curious that tbe court goes to great lengths to present statistical data as to the 
status of fair trade laws in other states and the District of Columbia. Id. at 579, 589, 
· 294 N.E.2d at 557; 363. The court decides that developments in other jurisdictions 
compel reconsideration of General Electric when the court's reconsideration involves 
only the interpretation of Massachusetts law (none of which has substantially changed 
since 1956). If the court is so concerned about the doctrine of stare decisis, I would 
think the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis would be more apt: 
in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative 
action is practically impossible, this Court has often over-ruled earlier decisions. 
The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, 
recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, 
is appropriate also in the judicial function. 
Burnet v. Coronado Oil Be Gas Co., 285 U.S. 595, 407-08 (1932) (dissenting opinion) (foot-
notes omitted). See also Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. White Cross Stores, Inc., 414 
Pa. 95, 199 A.2d 266 (1964). "[T]he courts should not perpetrate error solely for the 
reason that a previous decision, although erroneous, has been rendered on a given 
question."-Id. at 100, 199 A.2d at 268. 
7 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 580-81, 294 N.E.2d at 557-58; U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
8 Mass. ConaL pL II, c. 1, 11, arL IV, "as limited by arts. 1, 7, 10 and 12 of its 
Declaration of Rights." 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 581, 294 N.E.2d at 358. 
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power to private parties;"" and finally succumbed as an impermissible 
delegation of power: "[w]e hold that the nonsigner provision of G.L. 
c. 93, §14B, amounts to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
power to private parties."10 
The stipulated facts indicated that Corning produces and sells specialty 
glassware of standard quality in competition with similar glassware pro-
duced by other companies. Corning has considerable goodwill in its 
products and advertises its products heavily. Pursuant to G.L. c. 93, 
§§14A-14D, Corning entered into fair trade contracts with Massachusetts 
retailers other than Ann &: Hope in which the retailers agreed not to sell 
Corning products at prices other than "fair trade" prices set by Corning. 
Ann &: Hope was aware of fair trade contracts on the part of Corning 
and other retailers but sold Corning products at prices below fair trade 
prices.u 
The Supreme Judicial Court conceded that it was "bound" by decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court on federal questions, "regardless of 
rationale or lack thereof."12 Thus, Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Sea-
gram-Distillers Corp.1s is dispositive of Ann &: Hope's contentions that 
the nonsigner provision violates the due process and equal protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.1' 
Ann &: Hope also argued that "the nonsigner provision here in issue is 
an unreasonable exercise of the police power, unrelated to the public 
welfare, in violation of Part II, c. 1, §1, art. 4, of our State Constitution, 
as limited by arts. 1, 7, 10 and 12 of its Declaration of Rights."11i The 
court announced that "[o]n such issues ... we are not bound by Federal 
decisions,"16 but went on to note that as long as legislation "bears a real 
and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other 
phase of the general welfare,"17 the court "'cannot substitute [its] judg-
ment for that of the Legislature.' "18 
The Fair Trade Law was previously upheld as a valid exercise of the 
police power in General Electric: "'[o]ur decision ... [in the General 
8 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 586, 294 N.E.2d at !161. 
10 Id. at 589, 294 N.E.2d at 362. The Court is to be commended for its sense of the 
dramatic. 
11 Id. at 576-77, 294 N.E.2d at S55-56. 
12 Id. at 581, 294 N.E.2d at !158. 
18 299 u.s. 183 (19!16). 
14 The Court states that the rationale of the Old Dearborn case was undermined in 
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., Ml U.S. ll84 (1951), but goes on to note 
that "subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, though without 
rationale, make it clear that such assertions [that nonsigner provisions violate. the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment] present no 
substantial Federal question." 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 580, 294 N.E.2d at !158. 
111 Id. at 581, 284 N.E.2d at S58. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 585, 294 N.E.2d at 560, quoting General Elec. Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, Inc., 
!1!15 Mass. 665, 1!12 N.E.2d 652 (1956). 
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Electric case] necessarily holds that a manufacturer's good will is a valid 
legislative interest, and that the means adopted to protect that good will 
are appropriate.' "19 With the disappearance of the depressed economic 
condition from which fair trade legislation arose, the court was more 
willing to examine the effects of such legislation on a broader public 
interest rather than just the manufacturer's interest; however, the court 
was compelled to recognize that disputes as to what extent the nonsigner 
provision protects the public interest by preventing injurious price 
cutting, or harms such interest by the elimination of intrabrand price 
competition, involve questions of economic theory and political judg-
ment20 which are "regularly and properly resolved in the political and 
legislative arenas.''21 Thus, the court adhered to its previous judgment 
in General Electric: "that the Legislature could rationally conclude that 
authorization of resale price maintenance serves the public interest.''22 
When considering the question of an unlawful delegation of legislative 
power, the court was not willing to adhere to the conclusion in General 
Electric that "[t]he fair trade law does not constitute an unlawful dele-
gation of power to the owner of the trade mark or brand.''28 The court 
thought the question required greater consideration than that given in 
General Electric. 
First, the court adopted, without any discussion, the conclusions of 
Professor Davis: 
The plain fact is that the statute confers upon the manufacturer (or 
other distributor), acting in combination with a single retailer, 
[the power] to fix the minimum price at which other retailers may 
sell. That is undeniably a delegation of power to private parties,24 
Thus, the court took the first step in overruling General Electric Co. v. 
Kimbal jewelers, Inc.25 and contradicting Old Dearborn Distributing Co. 
v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.2o with few words of explanation. The court's 
"entire discussion of [the] question" consists of little more than the an-
nouncement of the conclusion.27 
19 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 582, 294 N.E.2d at 359, quoting Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. 
Elm Farm Foods Co., 337 Mass. 221, 228-29, 148 N.E.2d 861, 866 (1958). 
20 Id. at 584, 294 N.E.2d at 360. The court noted "[t]here is respectable current 
opinion in support of 'fair trade,' as well as in opposition. See National Institute on 
Prices and Pricing under the Antitrust laws, 41 Antitrust L.J. I, 14, 19 (1971); Callmann, 
Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies (lid ed.) §22.4." Id. 
21 Id. at 584, 294 N.E.2d at 360. 
22 Id. at 585, 294 N.E.2d at 360. 
23 333 Mass, at 677, 132 N.E.2d at 659. 
24 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 586,294 N.E.2d at 361 quoting K. Davis, Administrative Law 
Treatise §2.14 at 147 (1958 ed.). 
211 333 Mass. 665, 132 N.E.2d 652 (1956). 
26 299 u.s. 183 (1936). 
27 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 585-86, 294 N.E.2d at 860-61. It is disappointing that the 
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The court went on to examine the question as to "whether the dele-
gation is constitutionally permissible."2S Here the court abandoned any 
deference to legislative judgment, and, in the guise of wooden pronounce-
ments as to the constitutional limits of ("exceptions to or qualifications 
of") delegation of powers, the court substituted its own judgment29 as 
to the limits of "general public policy" behind fair trade legislation. The 
court went to great length to pay homage to the Legislature's determina-
tion of valid protectable interests,80 but proved such homage false by not 
even attempting to find any rational or reasonable basis upon which to 
uphold the legislative means adopted to protect such interests.Bl 
The court may be correct in concluding that changed economic con-
ditions no longer necessitate legislative protection of a manufacturer's 
good wil1.82 The court also may have selected the best available means for 
abolishing a particularly obnoxious legislative policy that permits a 
manufacturer, by agreement with a single retailer, to set resale prices for 
all retailers in the Commonwealth.ss However, the court's decision, as 
court did not specify the legislative power that it "concluded" to be delegated: was it 
the power to fix minimum prices, or the power "to fix the minimum price at which 
other retailers may sell?" In this regard, see Remington Arms Co. v. G.E.M. of St. 
Louis, 102 N.W .2d 528, 584-35 (Minn. 1960). Although, admittedly, such distinction is 
not necessary for analysis of the nonsigner provision of G.L c. 93, §14B, the distinction 
will be necessary upon a now likely challenge to the validity of contracts exempted 
pursuant to G.L c. 93, §l4A. 
28 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 586, 294 N.E.2d at 361. 
29 There is a possibility that the court merely desires to be "in harmony with most 
of the decisions in other States." Id. at 589, 294 N.E.2d at 363, thus escaping the stigma 
of being "one of the minority jurisdictions which hold the Fair Trade Law to be valid." 
Shulton, Inc. v. Consumer Value Stores, Inc., 352 Mass. 605, 607, 227 N.E.2d 482, 483 
(1967); see Black&: Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ann&: Hope, Inc., 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 143, 148, 
277 N.E.2d 687, 690. 
so 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 581-85, 294 N.E.2d at 358-61. 
81 See Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Ehn Farm Foods Co., 837 Mass. 221, 148 N.E.2d 861 
(1958): "the means adopted to protect that good will [held to be a "valid legislative 
interest'1 are appropriate." Id. at 229, 148 N.E.2d at 866; Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. 
v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 188 (1936): "[t]he price restriction is adopted as an 
appropriate means to that perfectly legitimate end [protection of the manufacturer's 
good will]." Id. at 193. See also I K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958 ed.): 
Some delegations to private parties are and ought to be valid. The question is one 
of judgment as to whether the courts should allow the legislative bodies to govern 
in this manner, or whether vague constitutional provisions should be interpreted 
to prevent vesting this kind of power in private parties. That question must be 
considered in the context of the broad policies for and against the so-called fair 
trade legislation, and it must be considered in the context of the variety of views 
about the fundamentals of the proper role of the judiciary in preventing what the 
judges deem to be bad government. 
Id. at §2.14 at 147 (footnotes omitted). 
82 Compare Coming Glass with General Elec. Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, Inc., 833 Mass. 
at 677, 132 N.E.2d at 658-59 and Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Ehn Farm Foods Co., 337 
Mass. at 229, 148 N.E.2d at 866. 
as Compare Mass. Const. pt. I, art. XXX. 
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written, creates serious doubt as to the validity of contracts executed 
pursuant to G.L. c. 93, §14A,B4 despite the deliberate attempt to limit 
its decision to consideration of only section 14B:811 section 14A sanctions 
contract provisions that prohibit resale of certain commodities "except 
at the price stipulated" by the manufacturer or distributor, yet the court 
states, with reference to such stipulated prices, that "[t]here is no provision 
• . . for any policy or standard to govern the prices set by [the manu-
facturer], nor for notice, hearing or judicial review of the prices fixed by 
the manufacturer."se 
Fair trade legislation has been the subject of debate for years; the 
court has not put an end to the controversy. This case is significant for 
what it does: it opens the entire "fair trade" scheme to question while 
invalidating only the nonsigner provision on the narrow grounds of an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The case is also signifi-
cant for what it does not do: the Fair Trade Law will be invulnerable to 
attack on the federal questions of due process or equal protection as well 
as a violation of the police power. In both events, the case invites, if not 
compels, legislative action either to establish a fair trade scheme immune 
from the court's whim, or to repeal anachronistic legislation that "most 
of the courts of other states" have held invalid. 
§10.5. Prohibition against discrimination in the furnishing of credit 
based on sex or marital status: Penalty provisions. Chapter 151B, 
section 4 of the General Laws was amended by chapter 168 of the Acts 
1973 to include a new subsection 14 which provides that it shall be an 
unlawful practice "[f]or any person furnishing credit or services to deny 
or terminate such credit or services or to adversely affect an individual's 
credit standing because of such individual's sex or marital status." 
Said subsection 14 was further amended by chapter 325 of the Acts of 
1973, which provides penalties for violation of the provisions of said 
subsection. A violator is liable for actual damages sustained, and, in the 
event that there are no actual damages, the court is authorized to assess 
special damages to the aggrieved party not to exceed $1,000. Additionally, 
any person who is adjudicated liable shall be assessed the cost of reason-
able legal fees actually incurred. 
84 The distinction made in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., !141 U.S. !184, 
!!88, !190 (1951) as between those retailers who have their prices fixed by "consensual 
agreement" and those retailers who have their prices fixed "by compulsion" or by force 
is specious; once the retailer decides to purchase a particular commodity for resale, the 
"price stipulated" by the manufacturer may, by reason of market conditions, be as well 
forced on "signers," by reason of G.L c. 9!1, §14A, as "nonsigners," by reason of G.L. 
c. 9!1, §14B. . 
811 To avoid misunderstanding, we point out that we are considering here only the 
constitutionality of the non·signer provision in G.L c. 9!!, §14B. The present record 
presents no question with respect to the validity of the contracts between Coming 
and Massachusetts retailers, and no such question has been argued to us. 
197!! Mass. Adv. Sh. at 580, 294 N.E.2d at ll57. 
86 Id. at 588, 294 N.E.2d at !162. 
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The Federal Truth-in-Lending Act Amendments of 1973 (United States 
Senate Bill S. 2101 which has been adopted by the Senate) contains a 
similar provision applicable to consumer credit. The Senate report relat-
ing to S. 2101 specifies a variety of practices which are deemed to be dis-
criminatory under the provisions of said billl The report, in essence, indi-
cates that credit application of a female should be processed on the same 
basis as that of a male; that is, if the female (whether married or single) 
qualifiies for credit under the standards applied to males by the credit 
grantor, it would be unlawful to deny such female credit or to condition 
the granting of credit upon the co-signing of the instrument evidencing 
the obligation by the female's spouse. 
· Under the new Massachusetts statute, it would appear to be unlawful 
to inquire on a credit application form or use as a basis for credit deter-
mination information concerning the sex or marital status of the appli-
cant, such as whether the applicant is married, divorced, separated, 
widowed, or single. This prohibition will require many credit grantors 
to revise their credit policies particularly with respect to the effect of a 
marital separation on the individual's credit standing. Additionally, 
· many shorthand devices used for the determination of creditworthiness, 
such as credit scoring systems, will require modification to the extent they 
contain factors based on the sex or marital status of the applicant for 
credit. 
Although it would appear that a creditor could not require the spouse 
of an applicant for credit to co-sign if the.applicant is qualified in his or 
her own right, the statute would not appear to make a joint application 
by married persons unlawful per se where the joint application is filed 
voluntarily by the married couple or where the credit grantor determines 
that the application of one spouse is not sufficiently favorable to warrant 
the granting of credit. Although not clear from a reading of the statute, 
it would appear that a creditor could require both spouses to execute the 
loan documentation where the security for the obligation is held in joint 
names, such as in the real estate mortgage situation where the residence 
is owned jointly. 
At the present time, the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimina-
tion has not adopted regulations relating to sex and marital status dis-
crimination, but has indicated that it intends to do so in the near future. 
§10.6. Protection against careless and erroneous billings: Definitions 
of "periodic billing statement" and "statement of account." The Pro-
tection of Consumers Against Careless and Erroneous Billings Act (G.L. 
c. 93C), became effective in 1972 and provides time limitations within 
which creditors must respond to a consumer who believes that a billing 
error has occurred with respect to his or her account. A troublesome 
aspect of the Act was its failure to define what was meant by a customer's 
§10.5. 1 Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Truth in Lending 
Act Amendments, S. Doc. No. 278, 9Sd Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975). 
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"statement of account." Counsel for creditors were unable to ascertain 
from the Act whether late notices, payment coupon books, payment pass-
books or notices relating to escrow payments were included in the term 
"statement of the customer's account." The Commissioner of Banks at· 
tempted to alleviate some of the difficulty by issuing regulations in 1972. 
The validity of those regulations is questionable because the Act lacked 
a grant of specific authority to the Commissioner to promulgate rules 
and regulations. 
Chapter 21 of the Acts of 1978 has eliminated some of the difficulties 
under the Act by providing express authority for the Commissioner of 
Banks to issue such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the 
provisions of the Act, and by defining the terms "periodic billing state-
ment" and "statement of account."l 
A periodic billing statement is defined as "any statement, notice or 
reminder of payment due on 3;11Y transaction which is mailed or delivered 
periodically to the customer in advance of the due date of the payment."2 
A statement of account is defined as a "periodic billing statement other 
than a delinquency notice, payment coupon book or payment passbook, 
or a statement, billing or advice relating exclusively to amounts to be 
paid by the customer as escrow amounts for payment of taxes, or insur-
ance, water,. sewer or land rents.''& 
Section 5 of chapter 93C was also amended to clarify an ambiguity as 
to when the required quarterly notices could be omitted by creditors. 
As amended, the section permits a creditor to omit a notice as to the 
customer's rights in any quarter in which no statement is transmitted 
during that quarter, unless there is an unsettled complaint as defined by 
the provisions of the Act. Therefore, if the creditor renders a statement 
in January, but not in February or March, a quarterly notice is required. 
Creditors who elected to include the notice with the last billing in each 
quarter must, in the situation described above, adopt a procedure de-
signed to insure that the customer receives a notice in March. Because of 
the difficulty of designing such a program, many creditors have elected to 
send the notice with every statement either separately or by printing 
the notice on the statement itself. 
§10.7. Consumer credit transactions: Default: Repossession: Redemp-
tion: Deficiency judgment: Notices required. Chapter 629 of the Acts 
of 1973 amends-G.L. c. ~55, §§131 &: 18J; G.L. c. 255B, §§20A &: 20B and 
G.L. c. 255D, §§21 &: 22. The amendments become effective January I, 
1974 and apply to consumer credit transactions entered into on and 
after that date. The amendments create new rights for debtors unable to 
carry out their contractual obligations. 
§10,6, 1 G.L c. 95C, 11. 
ll Id. 
a G.L c. 9!1C, 111, 6. 
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Under the new law, in any consumer credit transaction where the 
loan is secured by a non-possessory security interest, a provision in an 
instrument relating to a default is enforceable only to the extent that the 
default is material and consists of a failure to make one or more required 
payments, or the occurrence of an event which substantially impairs the 
value of the collateral. In order to act upon such a default the creditor 
must wait ten days and then send a notice of default to the debtor in 
the form provided by the statute. Until the notice is given, no action can 
be commenced against the debtor or the collateral. The notice must 
specify the debtor's right to cure and specify a date (which date must be 
not less than twenty-one days from the date of the giving of the notice) 
before which the cure must be made. In the event the debtor fails to 
cure within the time period specified in the notice, the creditor would 
then have the right to bring an action against the debtor or repossess 
the collateral. 
Repossession may occur only if (1) the creditor has followed the statu-
tory notice procedures outlined above, (2) the default is material and 
consists of a failure to pay or the occurrence of an event which substan-
tially impairs the value of the collateral, and (3) such repossession can be 
effected without force, without a breach of the peace and without entry 
upon property owned or rented by the debtor unless the debtor consents 
to such entry at the time of the entry. If any of the above conditions are 
not satisfied, the creditor must apply to a court, and, after notice to the 
debtor and a judicial hearing, the court may issue an order of repos-
session. 
In the event of the lawful repossession of the collateral, the debtor has 
the right to redeem the collateral within twenty days of the repossession 
and thereafter until the creditor has disposed of or entered into a contract 
for the disposition of the collateral. 
The new statute further provides that the debtor shall not be liable 
for any deficiency if the unpaid balance is $2,000 or less at the time the 
creditor takes possession of or accepts surrender of the collateral. In those 
circumstances where the debtor is liable for a deficiency, the statute pro-
vides that "published trade estimates of the retail value of goods shall .•. 
be presumed to be the fair market value of the collateral." 
A major objective of the new statute appears to be the establishment of 
time limitations which are imposed upon creditors from the date of the de-
fault until the creditor may bring an action against the debtor, repossess or 
accelerate the debt. The creditor must wait ten days before giving notice 
of the default and then advise the debtor that he has twenty-one days to 
cure the default. A major effect of the statute is the elimination of de-
ficiency judgments where the unpaid balance of the loan is $2,000 or 
less at the time of the repossession or the surrender of the collateral by 
the debtor. The limitation of a default to those situations where the 
debtor has failed to pay or where the collateral has been substantially im-
17
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paired in value would not seem to be of major significance as most 
defaults are occasioned by a failure to pay. Curiously this debtor-oriented 
statute does not extend as far as those which would require, either on due 
process grounds or by statute, that notice be given to the debtor and a 
judicial hearing occur prior to any repossession. Notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard are required by the statute only where the default 
is not material or does not occur because of a failure to pay or a sub-
stantial impairment of the value of the collateral. It is submitted that 
the vast majority of defaults will be caused by a failure to pay, and few 
instances will thus arise requiring the judicial hearing mandated by the 
statute. 
Although there are some inconsistencies and ambiguities in the statute, 
counsel for creditors faced with a default and the necessity of taking 
some action against the consumer or the collateral ought to be familiar 
with the new procedures and advise their clients as to the procedures 
required by the same. 
§10.8. Maximum finance charges for consumer open end credit trans-
actions.· G.L c. I40, §114B, which was adopted in 1972 to become 
effective July I, I973, was amended prior to its effective date to correct 
certain deficiencies in the previous legislation.1 The section as amended 
establishes maximum interest rates with respect to consumer open end 
credit plans. Such rates may not exceed an annual percentage rate of 
I8% on the first $500 of the balance subj~ct to finance charge and I2% 
on so much of such balance as exceeds $500. In the event that a monthly 
finance charge does not exceed fifty cents, a minimum finance charge of 
fifty cents may be assessed.2 
G.L c. 140C, §6B was also amended to provide that a finance charge 
imposed under an open end credit plan on balances resulting from the 
sale of goods or services in reliance on a credit card may not be applied to 
any portion of such balance which is reflected for the first time on the 
billing statement, and otherwise must be computed on (I) the previous 
balance method after deducting all credits and payments received dur-
ing the period, (2) the average daily balance method, or (3) the ~ly 
balance method.a In addition, payments received under an open end 
credit plan, and also under a retail installment sale agreement subject to 
G.L. c. 255D, must be credited promptly to the obligor's account and in 
any event no more than two business days after receipt by the creditor. 
The amendments discussed in this section became effective on July 1, 
I973. 
§10.9. Credit cards: Issuance by co-operative banks. Chapter I70 
of the Massachusetts General Laws has been amended by chapter 258 of 
§10.8. 1 1 Acts of 1975, c. 275, §1. 
2 G.L c. 140, §ll4B. 
a Acts of 1975, c. 275, §5. 
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the Acts of 1973 to include a new section 32C which permits a co-opera-
tive bank to issue credit cards for the purpose of making loans to one 
or more persons. The outstanding principal balance of loans made 
through the use of such a credit card to any one penon may not 
exceed $4,500 at any one time and the outstanding principal balance of 
such loans may not exceed ten percent of the deposits of the co-operative 
bank. The authority is similar to that provided in 1972 to savings banks1 
and will result in an increase in competition between cooperative, savings 
and commercial banks. 
§10.10. Checks: "Holder in due course": "Good faith". In the case 
of Industrial National Bank v. Leo's Used Car Exchange, Inc.,1 the de-
fendant involved had made two checks payable to Villa's Auto Sales, Inc. 
in consideration of the purchase of three automobiles. These checks were 
cashed for a corporate officer by a teller at a branch of the plaintiff bank. 
The drawee bank dishonored the checks upon presentation pursuant to 
a stop payment order issued by the defendant and the plaintiff thereafter 
brought this action claiming the status of a holder in due course.2 
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course, it takes the 
checks free from all defenses of any party with whom it has not dealt 
(except for certain so-called "real defenses" which were not present in 
the instant case).a A holder in due course is a holder who takes an 
instrument of value, in good faith, and without notice that it is overdue 
or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the 
part of any person. 4 
The trial court found that the plaintiff met all of the tests for holder 
in due course status except the "good faith" requirement. The determin-
ation that the plaintiff lacked good faith apparently was based upon the 
cashing of the corporate checks by the bank's teller. The evidence 
indicated that the bank had a rule requiring branch manager approval 
before a corporate check could be cashed, that the teller in the instant 
case failed to obtain such approval, but that the manager in the instant 
case knew the corporate officer who "cashed" the checks and would have 
given his approval. No other evidence as to the good faith of the plaintiff 
was introduced. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the finding of the trial court, 
noting that the inclusion of observance of "reasonable commercial stan-
dards" as part of the test of "good faith" had been stricken from earlier 
drafts of the Uniform Commercial Code. Good faith is defined in the 
§10.9. 1 G~. c. 168, §li7B. 
§10.10. 1 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. 79, 291 N.E.2d 605. 
2 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 80-81, 291 N.E.2d at 604-05. 
a G.L c. 106, §!1-!105. 
4 G.L c. 106, §ll-!102(1). 
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Code as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."11 
The court stated: "[N]othing in the definition suggests that in addition 
to being honest, the holder must exercise due care to be in good faith."6 
Further, "good faith" is to be determined by the simple test of honesty 
and not by a test as to the holder's diligence or negligence, unless the 
conduct of the holder is so "outrageous" as to bring into question the 
honer.ty of the holder.7 
Finding no evidence of the plaintiff's dishonesty, the court held that 
the plaintiff qualified as a holder in due course and in the absence of 
any "real defenses" ordered judgments to be entered for the plaintiff 
on each instrument. 
§10.11. Comptroller of the Currency: Rulings and regulations: Au· 
thority of national banking associations to provide travel agency services. 
The issue of whether national banking associations have the authority 
to provide travel agency services to their customers has again been the 
subject of .an appeal and again the national banks have been rebuffed. 
The case of Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Campl involved an action commenced 
against the Comptroller of the Currency and a national bank located in 
Massachusetts to contest the validity of a 1963 regulation authorizing 
national banks to offer general travel agency services. At this state of 
the proceeding the First Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the actions 
of the federal district court in Boston which had granted the plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment.2 
The parties to the action agreed that if there was any statutory 
authorization permitting national banks to engage in the travel agency 
business, it was to be found in that clause of the National Bank Act 
which permits such banks "[t]o exercise •.. all such incidental powers 
as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking ..• ,"8 
The court of appeals indicated its disagreement with the sine qua non 
standard which could have been implied from the decision of the district 
court. The court stated the use of the word "necessary" in the incidental 
powers clause did not mean that the activities in which the bank desired 
to engage must be "indispensable" to the operation of the bank, but that 
such services must be directly related to one or another of the national 
bank's express powers.4 As stated by the court: 
II G.L. c. 106, §1·201(19). 
8 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 82, 291 N.E.2d at 606. 
'1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 88 n.6, 291 N.E.2d at 606 n.6. 
§lo.Il. 1 472 F.2d 4Zl (1st Cir. 1972). For a discussion of the First Circuit's decision, 
see Note, 15 B.C. Ind. &: Com. L R.ev. 206 (1978). See also 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§6.14. 
2 472 F .2d at 428. 
8 12 U.S.C. §24, Seventh (1970). 
4 472 F.2d at 4!10. 
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In our opinion, these decisions amply demonstrate that a national 
bank's activity is authorized as an incidental power, "necessary to 
carry on the business of banking," within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. · 
§24, Seventh, if it is convenient or useful in connection with the 
perfonnance of one of the bank's established activities pursuant to 
its express powers under the National Bank Act. If this connection 
between the incidental activity and an express power does not exist, 
the activity is not authorized as an incidental power.ll 
Having established the appropriate legal standard, the court reviewed 
the express powers of a national bank and compared them to the nature 
of the travel agency business,6 examined the position of the Comptroller 
prior to 19637 (which denied the authority of national banks to engage 
in such services) and reviewed the frequency of the offering of such 
services by national banks in the pasts (only a few offered such services). 
Having considered the factors indicated, the court detennined that the 
district court had not erred in concluding that the operation of a travel 
agency was not "incidental" to the business of banking. The findings of 
the district court, including the finding that the 1963 regulation of the 
Comptroller was invalid, were upheld. The court of appeals did, how-
ever, recommend a slight modification of the district court's order, 
indicating that the lower court should give serious consideration to any 
presentation which the national bank might offer with respect to whether 
the six-month divestiture period was sufficient time for the bank reason-
ably to divest itself of its travel agency operation.9 The clear implication 
of the court of appeals was that the divestiture period was indeed too 
short. 
§10.12. Second Mortgage Statute: Increase in assessed value of real 
estate subject to said statute. G.L. c. 140, §90A, the so-called "Second 
Mortgage Statute," defines a loan subject to its provisions as 
a loan of more than fifteen hundred dollars secured wholly or 
partially by a mortgage of real estate having an assessed value of 
not over forty thousand dollars, having thereon a dwelling house 
with accommodations for six or less separate households and occu-
pied in whole or in part at the time the loan is made as a home 
by any obligor on the mortgage debt or by any person granting or 
releasing any interest under said mortgage • . • . -
Chapter 19 of the Acts of 1973 increased the amount of the assessed 
valuation from $25,000 to $40,000, thereby providing additional protec-
tion to Massachusetts home owners in light of recent changes in assess-
II ld. at 482. 
e Id. at 488. 
7 Id. at 484-85. 
s Id. at 485. 
9 Id. at 488. 
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ment policies requiring "100% valuation." It should be noted that the 
Commissioner of Banks takes the position that assessed value means 
the value assessed by the local taxing authorities upon the mortgaged 
real property. 
§10.13. Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Law: Technical amend-
ments. The Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Law (chap-
ter 90D of the Massachusetts General Laws) was amended by chapter 81 
of the Acts of I973 to cure various technical deficiencies in the statute 
as originally adopted in 1971. Knowledge of the Act is important for 
credit grantors because the law provides the sole method of perfecting a 
security interest in a vehicle which is titled under the law.1 Several of 
the amendments relate to the security aspects of the title law. 
One difficulty with the original statute involved the conditions under 
which a "previously registered vehicle" had to be titled. The difficulty 
arose because of the interrelationship of section 2(9) and section 35. 
Section 2(9) indicated that a previously registered vehicle must be titled 
if the vehicle was "transferred" on or after September I, I972. On the 
other hand, section 35 indicated that such a vehicle need not be titled 
until, among other things, it was purchased from a dealer in the Com-
monwealth. This inconsistency has been eliminated by deleting section 
2(9) and by revising section 35 to require the owner to obtain a title 
when "there is a change in the ownership thereof ... .''2 This change 
conforms with the position that the Registrar of Motor Vehicles adopted 
at the time the Certificate of Title Law became effective. 
In addition to the change of ownership section indicated above, 
section 35 was amended so that the law becomes applicable to a pre-
viously registered vehicle when there is (a) a certificate of title issued for 
the vehicle; (b) a security interest created in the vehicle; or (c) September 
I, I979, whichever first occurs. Previously, the section made the law 
applicable to a previously registered vehicle whenever (a) it was pur-
chased from a dealer in the Commonwealth; (b) a certificate of title was 
issued for the vehicle; (c) a security interest was created in the vehicle; 
(d) a lienholder who had an unperfected security interest on September 
I, I972 notified the owner that he wanted the security interest perfected; 
or (e) September I, I974, whichever first occurred. The postponement of 
the date to I979 was made at the request of the Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles to eliminate the potential for a mass titling of the older motor 
vehicles immediately prior to the September 1, 1974 deadline. 
Section lO(e) was amended so as to provide that the certificate of title, 
as distinguished from the vehicle itself, is not subject to attachment, 
execution, or other judicial process.3 The previous language of sub-
§10.1!1. 1 G.L c. 90D, §26. 
2 Acts of 197!1, c. 81, §7. 
3 Acts of 197!1, c. 81, §!I. 
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section (e) indicated that it would not be lawful to levy upon the vehicle, 
but did not expressly indicate whether the vehicle could be attached or 
made subject to other judicial process. 
Section 22 of chapter 90D was amended to permit an owner who 
creates a security interest in the vehicle to mail the title with the appro-
priate notation of the security interest to the lienholder, or, at the lien-
holder's request, to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.4 Previously the 
statute required the owner to deliver the documentation directly to 
the lienholder. 
Section 26 previously provided that the method provided by chapter 
90D for perfecting and giving notice of security interests in motor 
vehicles for which certificates of title are issued was exclusive. That 
section was amended to provide that the method of perfecting a security 
interest in a vehicle for which a certificate of title is issued, or is required 
to be issued, is exclusive.• 
Section 28 of chapter 90D was amended to include a $1 fee for the 
addition of a lienholder upon an existing certificate of title and to 
provide for a $3 fee in the event the Registrar is requested to amend or 
correct an outstanding certificate of title.6 
Section 37 was amended by re-writing said section to provide that the 
perfection of a security interest, created prior to September 1, 1972, is 
to be governed by the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
until a certificate of title is issued naming the secured party as a lien-
holder.7 Previously the perfection of such a security interest was to lapse 
no later than September 1, 1974. 
§10.14. Banks: Indemnification of directors, trustees, officers, employ· 
ees and agents. Chapter 167 of the Massachusetts General Laws was 
amended by chapter 80 of the Acts of 1973 to include a new section 57A, 
which permits a bank to indemnify its directors, trustees, officers, em-
ployees and other agents. The statute expressly permits indemnification 
of expenses incurred in defending a civil or criminal action and further 
authorizes advance payments of expenses prior to the determination of 
whether such person is entitled to be indemnified if the indemnitee 
agrees to repay such expenses in the event that he shall be adjudicated 
thereafter not to be entitled to indemnification. 
No indemnification is permitted with respect to any person relating 
to any matter as to which he shall be adjudicated in any proceeding not 
to have acted in good faith in the reasonable belief that his action was 
in the best interests of the bank. 
Banks are permitted by the statute to purchase and maintain insurance 
4 Acts of 197!1, c. 81, §4. 
li Acts of 197!1, c. 81, §5. 
8 Acts of 197!1, c. 81, §6. 
7 Acts of 197!1, c. 81, §8. 
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covering any liability of a director, trustee, officer, employee or other 
agent regardless of whether the bank would have the power to indemnify 
such individual against such liability. 
STUDENT COMMENT 
§10.15. The Fair Trade Law: Constitutionality of the nonsigner pro-
vision: Coming Glass Works v. Ann 0' Hope, Inc.1 The plaintiff, 
Corning Glass Works, brought a bill in equity under G.L. c. 93, §14B2 
(the nonsigner provision of the Massachusetts Fair Trade Law) to enjoin 
the defendant, Ann 8e Hope of Danvers, Inc., from "knowingly and will-
fully advertising, offering for sale or selling any products bearing plaintiff's 
trademarks, brands, or names, at prices less than the fair trade prices set 
by plaintiff pursuant to the Fair Trade Law .•.• "8 
§10.15. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 575, 294 N.E.2d 854. 
2 The substance of the Fair Trade Law is contained in G.L. c. 98, §§A, B, and reads 
as follows: 
§14A. No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity which bean, or the 
label or container of which bean, or the vending equipment from which said com-
modity is sold to consumen bean, the trade·mark, brand or name of the producer 
or owner of such commodity and which is in fair and open competition with com-
modities of the same general class produced by othen shall be deemed in violation 
of any law of the commonwealth by reason of any of the following provisions which 
may be contained in any such contract: 
(1) That the buyer will not resell such commodity except at the price stipulated 
by the vendor. 
(2) That the producer or vendee of a commodity require upon the sale of such 
commodity to another, that such purchaser agree that he will not, In tum, resell 
except at the price stipulated by such producer or vendee. 
Such provisions in any such contract shall be deemed to contain or imply condi· 
tions that such commodity may be resold without reference to such agreement in 
the following cases. 
(I) In dosing out the owner's stock for the purpose of discontinuing delivery of 
any such commodity; provided, that such stock is fint offered to the manufacturer 
of such stock at the original invoice stock price, at least 10 days before such stock 
shall be offered for sale to the public. 
(2) When the goods are damaged or deteriorated in quality, and notice is given 
to the public thereof. 
(8) By any officer acting under orden of the court. 
§l4B. Willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commod· 
ity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into punuant to the 
preceding section, whether the person so advertising, offering for sale or selling is 
or is not a party to such contract, is hereby declared to constitute unfair competition 
and to be actionable at the suit of any penon damaged thereby. Any penon adver-
tising. offering for sale or selling any commodity as aforesaid shall, in addition, 
forfeit through civil process to the Commonwealth the sum of fifty dollars. 
[Emphasis added.] 
8 Reservation and Report at 7, Corning Glass Works v. Ann Be Hope, Inc., 1978 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 575, 294 N.E.2d 854 [hereinafter cited as Reservation and Report] •. 
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The defendant's answer asserted, inter alia, that G.L c. 93, §14B was 
unconstitutional in that it 
deprives the defendant of its property rights without due process of 
law; it invidiously discriminates against non-signers, denying them 
equal protection of our laws; and it is an illegal delegation by the 
General Court to a private person of the legislature's exclusive con-
trol over prices,4 
More specifically, it was contended that section 14B of chapter 93 of the 
General Laws was promulgated in violation of Articles I, VII, X, XI, 
XXI and XXX of the Declaration of Human Rights of the Massachusetts 
Constitution.rs 
The suit was instituted in Suffolk Superior Court, judgment reserved, 
and the case reported to the full bench of the Supreme Judicial Court.6 
The sole question at issue was the constitutionality of a statute which 
authorizes the producer of a brand name product to set the price of that 
product in a contract with a retailer and further forbids all other retailers 
4 Id. at 10. 
II For purposes of this note, it is necessary to consider only art. XXX, which reads: 
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never 
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The executive shall 
never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: The judicial 
shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers or either of them: to the 
end it may be a government of laws and not of men. 
Mass. Const. pt. I, art. XXX. 
Defendant never sought to interpose by way of a defense Mass. Const. pt. II, ch. 1, 
§1, art. IV, which reads in part: 
And further, full power and authority are hereby given and granted to the said 
General Court •.. to make, ordain, and establish, all manner of wholesome and 
reasonable Orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances, directions and instructions, either 
with penalties or without .••. 
Defendant relied solely on art. XXX of the Declaration of Human Rights in arguing 
that G.L. c. 9!1, §14B was an invalid delegation of legislative authority. 
It may reasonably be argued that pt. II, ch. I, §l, art. IV is a broad grant of powers 
to the General Court and does not impose any limitations on the alienability of the 
legislative power. If this is so, then defendant correctly relied upon art. XXX of the 
Declaration of Human Rights. Yet art. XXX, read literally, imposes specific limitations 
on the alienability of legislative authority solely with respect to the executive and judi· 
cial branChes of government. Art. XXX articulates the separation of powers among the 
three branches of state government. Part II, ch. I, §1, art. IV, on the other hand, makes 
the General Court the sole repository of legislative authority. 
A more proper argument seeking to invalidate any legislation as an invalid delegation 
of legislative authority to private persons would refer the court to both art. XXX of 
the Declaration of Human Rights and pt. II, ch. 1, §1, art. IV of the constitution. See 
Opinion of the Justices, !128 Mass. 674, 105 N.E.2d 565 (1952): Landers v. Eastern Racing 
Ass'n, !127 Mass. !12, 97 N.E.2d 202 (1951). The Coming court did, in fact, cite part II, 
ch. 1, §1, art. IV in invalidating the nonsigner provision of the Fair Trade Law. 
6 The case was reported with a companion case, LCA Corp., S.W. Farber Div. v. Ann 
Be Hope. The records were consolidated inasmuch as identical issues were presented. 
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who have knowledge of the contract from selling below the stipulated 
price. 
Corning Glass Works (Corning) is a New York corporation which 
manufactures and distributes specialty glassware under the familiar 
brandnames of "Pyrex" and "Corning Ware." As a result of advertise-
ment, promotion and public acceptance of these products, Corning has 
acquired a goodwill in its trademarks and brandnames. -r Corning has 
executed numerous agreements under the Massachusetts Fair Trade Law 
wherein other retailers have agreed not to advertise, offer for sale or sell 
any of Corning's products at prices other than the fair trade prices stipu-
lated in the contract. The effect of G.L. c. 93, §14B is to bind all retailers 
who have knowledge of any such agreement to the price schedule estab-
lished by the manufacturer.s It is of no matter that the retailer with 
noticeD has not sign!!d, or refuses to sign, a similar agreement. In the 
instant case it was. stipulated that the defendant, Ann 8e Hope of Dan-
vers, Inc. (Ann 8e Hope), was aware of the existence of many such agree-
ments.10 At no time had Ann 8e Hope or any of its authorized agents 
entered into a fair trade agreement with Corning. It was further stipu-
lated that the plaintiff's products were in free and open competition with 
other products of the same general class,11 that the defendant had in fact 
disposed of the plaintiff's products in violation of G.L. c. 93, §14B, and 
that the violations did not arise under any of the exceptional circum-
stances enumerated in G.L. c. 93, §14A.12 
In summary, the plaintiff argued that the nonsigner provision of the 
Fair Trade Law was a legitimate and permissible method to ptotect the 
7 See Statement of Facts, Reservation and Report, supra note lJ, at 11-12. 
8 For text of §14B, see note 2 supra. 
9 It is clear that §l4B would apply in the case where a retailer acquires certain prop-
erty for resale with the knowledge that it was subject to fair trade restriction. It is not 
clear, however, exactly what would happen in the case where a retailer acquires prop· 
erty without notice of any restriction and subsequent to acquisition and prior to sale 
he is notified of the restriction. A literal reading of §l4B would seem to indicate that 
he would have been bound to the extent of his knowledge at the time of resale. But 
see Old Dearborn Distrib. Co, v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 18lJ (19lJ6), disCussed 
in text at note lJl infra; see also General Elec. Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, Inc., lJlJlJ Mass. 
665, llJ2 N.E.2d 652 (1956). 
These cases suggest that the retailer must have had knowledge of the restriction at 
the time of acquisition of the property in order to be bound by· the nonsigner clause. 
10 Reservation and Report, supra note !1, at 12. 
11 In Shulton, Inc. v. Consumer Value Stores, Inc., lJ52 Mass. 605, 227 N.E.2d 482 
(1967), the court said: ''Whether competition is 'fair and open' presents a question of 
law which cannot be admitted under the guise of a question of fact • • • ," Id. at 609, 
227 N.E.2d at 484. This is merely to say that a conclusion of law cannot be admitted 
by an agreed stipulation between the parties. As in Shulton, the court could have re-
manded the case to the trial court for a full determination as to the question of 
whether Corning's products were, both factually and legally, in "fair and open com-
petition." It chose not to do so. See 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §lJ.ll. 
12 For text of §14A, see note 2 supra. 
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goodwill inherent in the plaintiff's trademarks.1s Price-cutting, it was 
argued, tends to cheapen the product in the eyes of the public with a 
consequent decline in sales.l4 Furthermore, predatory price-cutting by 
high volume outlets threatens an effective distribution system;1G large 
retailers are able to undersell small retailers, eventually forcing them out 
of business, thereby reducing the total number of outlets available to the 
consumer. The plaintiff further contended that the nonsigner provision 
was merely a legal recognition of the property rights retained by the 
manufacturer.16 It was reasoned that the defendant could acquire no 
property rights in plaintiffs trademarks merely by purchasing an item 
bearing that trademark. That degree of interest retained by the manu-
facturer enabled him to condition the resale of a branded commodity. 
Furthermore, where defendant acquires a product with knowledge of a 
reasonable restriction he is deemed to have consented to the -restriction.17 
Ann & Hope answered these contentions by referring to the history of 
the fair trade movement which allegedly indicates that these laws were 
designed primarily to support the profit margins of the small retailer. If, 
in fact, this is the principal effect of the laws, they would be beyond the 
scope of the police power of the state in that they protect a special interest 
to the detriment of the public at large. Ann & Hope also hypothesized 
that there are less arbitrary methods to protect the goodwill attached to 
a trademark.1s Finally, it was argued that the nonsigner provision 
amounted to an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to private 
parties. It effectively allowed the manufacturer to determine the prices 
at which the retailer would sell, and it did so without notice to interested 
parties, without opportunity for them to be heard, without identifiable 
standards, and without opportunity for review. It would thus be an in-
tolerable and unconstitutional invasion of the free market.1D 
18 Brief for Plaintiff at 8, Coming Glass Works v. Ann 8e Hope, Inc., 1973 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 575, 294 N.E.2d 354. 
14 Id. at Zl. 
1G ld. at 28, 29. 
16 Id. at 7-12. 
17 Id. 
18 See, e.g., G.L c. 93, §§14E-K (Unfair Sales Law) (prohibiting sales below cost); G.L 
c. 93A, §2 (prohibiting unfair methods of competition, unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices); G.L c. 110, §§2, 3, 7-11 (prohibiting "palming off" confusion of goods, imita-
tion and "dilution'); G.L. c. 93, §§1, 2, 8, 9, 14 (prohibiting noncompetition covenants, 
monopolies, price discrimination boycotts, tie-in sales). 
19 For a complete discussion of the relative merits of resale price maintenance, see 
Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64 Yale L.J. 967 (1955); Fulda, 
Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. Chi. L Rev. 175 (1954); Herman, Fair Trade, Origins, 
Purposes and Competitive Effects, 27 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 621 (1959); Federal Trade 
Comm'n, Report on Resale Price Maintenance, Summary and, Conclusion (1945) 
[hereinafter cited as FTC Report]. These authorities conclude generally that resale 
price maintenance is a device primarily designed to preserve profit margins and only 
incidentally designed to protect goodwill. See also 2 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1f 6000-6374 
(1972). 
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The court, declining to review the wisdom of the Act on the ground 
that it was at least arguably in the public interest, nevertheless HELD: 
G.L. c. 93, §14B is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority 
in violation of Article XXX of the Declaration of Human Rights and 
pt. II, ch. 1, §1, art. 4 of the state constitution.20 
This comment will consider first two early decisions which effectively 
restricted fair trade to specific contracts involving goods in intrastate 
commerce. It will then trace the legislative attempts to provide a much 
needed antitrust exemption. for state enacted fair trade laws. The latter 
part of the comment will analyze selected state decisions which held that 
the constitutionality of nonsigner provisions turns on due process con-
siderations and finally it will examine Corning and those decisions which 
hold that the constitutionality of nonsigner provisions turns on the valid-
ity of the delegation of legislative authority inherent in the nonsigner 
provisions. 
I. HISTORY OF FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION 
In 1901 the Supreme Judicial Court first dealt with what has become 
known as "resale price maintenance"21 in Garst v. Hall & Lyon Co.22 
In that case a manufacturer sought to enjoin a retail druggist from selling 
his tonic at less than the price stipulated in a contract to which the de-
fendant was not a party. It should be remembered that at the time there 
was nowhere in existence even the shadow, let alone the substance, of a 
fair trade law.2B Refusing to enjoin the defendant from selling below the 
stipulated price, the court stated: 
The purchaser ... has an absolute right to dispose of the property. 
He may consume it or sell it to another. The plaintiff has contracts 
from his vendees in regard to the prices at which they will sell .•.• 
If they sell in violation of their contracts ... he has a remedy against 
20 Corning Glass Works v. Ann Be Hope, Inc., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 575, 589, 294 
N.E.2d 554, 562·65. 
21 The terms "resale price maintenance," "vertical price fixing" and "fair 
trade" all refer to the same practice whereby a manufacturer establishes the retail price 
for any of his branded products. All fair trade laws, however they denominate this 
practice, involve a provision allowing, as a matter of policy, contracts between a manu· 
facturer and a retailer stipulating the price at which the retailer will sell the branded 
commodity. Most of the laws mntain a further provision binding all retailers who have 
knowledge of the mntract to the stipulations contained therein. The latter provision 
has come to be known as the "nonsigner clause." 
22 179 Mass. 588, 61 N.E. 219 (1901). 
28 California adopted the first fair trade law in 19!11, an act permitting vertical price 
fixing contracts. The law was amended in 1955 to include a nonsigner provision. Cal. 
Bus. Be Prof. Code §16,904 (West 1964). Following this a number of states enacted fair 
trade legislation in the early and mid 19110's. Massachusetts enacted its statute in 1957. 
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them to recover his damages. This right is founded on the personal 
contract alone, and it can be enforced only against the contracting 
party.24 
The court added that the plaintiff's trademark did not give him the rights 
of a patentee in property manufactured under a patent. It concluded that 
a trademark is to secure the manufacturer and the public from deception 
and fraud as to the origin and source of a commodity.211 Thus, even in 
this early case, the court was unable to find the requisite relationship be-
tween the manufacturer and the branded commodity to extend equitable 
relief for violation of a property interest. If there was to be a proprietary 
interest sufficient to compel a nonsigner to sell at a stipulated price, it 
would have to be legislatively created inasmuch as it did not inhere in the 
common law.26 
Then in 1911, the United States Supreme Court dealt fair trade a fur-
ther blow when in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park b Sons Co.p 
it ruled that even explicit contracts between manufacturers and subscrib-
ing retailers containing a resale price schedule were invalid as violative 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.2s The Dr. Miles decision signalled the 
demise, at least until there might be curative legislation, of vertical price 
fixing arrangements of any sort where the subject of such agreement was 
in interstate commerce. This substantially reduced the incidence and 
effectiveness of resale price maintenance agreements. The debate on fair 
trade receded somewhat for a period of twenty years.29 
In 1931, California became the first state to enact a statute permitting 
vertical resale price maintenance by agreement or contract.ao Two years 
later it was amended to include a nonsigner provision.B1 Of course, the 
24 179 Mass. 588, 591, 61 N.E. 219, 219-20 (1901) (citation omitted). 
211 Id. 
26 But see Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 969-77 
(1928); Adams, supra note 19, at 975-78 (1955). 
27 220 U.S. ll7ll (19ll). In Dr. Miles the Court was willing to weigh the relative bene-
fits of resale price maintenance against those of free and unrestrained competition in 
the market. It conceded that some restraints on trade may be permissible if reasonable 
and necessary. There, the balance spoke against resale price maintenance. Id. at 405-09. 
28 15 u.s.c. §11-7 (1970). 
29 The early drive for legalization of resale price maintenance was spearheaded 
by the American Fair Trade League, an association of manufacturers of branded 
goods, organized in 19lll. Throughout the twenty-odd years of its leadership of the 
fair trade movement the League ••• concentrated its efforts on securing federal 
legislation sanctioning resale price maintenance contracts. However, although 
the movement was sufficiently influential during this period to secure the introduc-
tion of a fair trade bill in each session of Congress, from 1914 onward, the desired 
legislation was not yet forthcoming. 
Herman, supra note 19, at 625; see also Comment, U. Ill. L.F. ll07, ll08 (1967). 
so Cal. Bus. Be Prof. Code §116,900-13 (West 1964). 
81 Cal. Bus. Be Prof. Code §16,904 (West 1964). 
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Dr. Miles decision effectively prevented this statute from applying to 
contracts arising in interstate commerce. 
By this time the National Association of Retail Druggists had assumed 
the lead in urging passage of statutes permitting vertical price fixing. 
The motives of this association were suspect if for no other reason than 
the fact that it represented retailers and not manufacturers. Proposed 
legislation was repeatedly submitted by the association on the grounds 
that it was a reasonable measure for the protection of manufacturers' 
goodwill in a trademark. The Federal Trade Commission, however, saw 
otherwise: 
One of the principal objectives of the National Association of 
Retail Druggists ... has been to obtain for retail druggists a margin 
of not less than 33Ys percent on the selling price, equivalent to a 
50-percent mark-up on cost, on all products sold through drug stores. 
Beginning in 1935 the National Association of Retail Druggists made 
the enactment of State resale price maintenance laws and the passage 
of a national resale price maintenance law the main objective of its 
activities, and the obtaining of 33Ys percent margin, at least, on mini-
mum selling prices its second objective.s2 
It is not the purpose of this note to make a detailed analysis of the 
special interest influence brought to bear on these issues. It is sufficient 
to note that with the coming of the Depression, more and more states 
sought measures to control the disastrous effects of desperation selling. 
Though fair trade laws are not specifically designed to eliminate this 
practice characteristic of severe deflationary periods, one side effect might 
be to curb such selling. By the end of 1936 fifteen states88 had enacted 
statutes which permitted resale price maintenance of goods shipped 
wholly in intrastate commerce. 
In early 1935 the Supreme Court was on the verge of invalidating the 
administration's social experiment, the National Industrial Recovery Act 
and the offshoot "Codes of Fair Competition."M The codes included 
minimum resale provisions designed, in part, to prevent panic selling at 
below cost.811 When the codes were invalidated it was feared that depressed 
conditions would signal the spread of this condition once again. Some saw 
vertical price fixing as a reasonable alternative that was not without 
precedent; as one state court explained: 
82 FTC Report, supra note 19, at XXXI. 
88 Arizona, California, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, New 
York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, R.hode Island, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. 
84 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 2ll8 (1956); A.LA. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1955); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 29!1 U.S. !188 
(19!15). 
811 See Fulda, supra note 19. 
30
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 13
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1973/iss1/13
§10.15 COMMERCIAL LAW 267 
The Fair Trade Acts were adopted in an effort to salvage some of the 
wreckage of the ill-fated N.I.R.A., commonly spoken of as the NRA. 
When the Supreme Court of the United States struck down that 
attempt by the national government to completely control and 
dominate business, labor, and industry, distributors who had been 
organized in Code Authorities under NRA and had dealt with the 
problems of loss leaders, price cutting and so-called predatory or 
cut-throat price competition, turned to the fair trade acts as a 
partial substitute.86 
In light of Dr. Miles,87 however, the proponents of fair trade were 
severely restricted. It was unlikely that manufacturers- selling to in-state 
retailers would want to fair trade an item when a comparable item 
shipped from out of state would be subject to no such limitation. Fair 
trade is an animal that must either thrive or die. 
Finally, in 1936, the fair trade movement was revitalized as a result 
of two decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court, Old 
Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.ss and a companion 
case.a9 The Court in Old Dearborn upheld the Illinois Fair Trade Act 
against arguments that it denied due process of law and the equal pro-
tection of the laws, and in so doing it stated: 
We are here dealing not with a commodity alone, but with a com-
modity plus the brand or trade-mark which it bears as evidence of its 
origin and of the quality of the commodity for which the brand or -
trademark stands. Appellants own the commodity; they do not own 
the mark or the goodwill the mark symbolizes. And goodwill is prop-
erty in a very real sense, injury to which, like injury to any other 
species of property, is a proper subject for legislation.40 
Seizing on the notion of a property interest which inheres in goodwill, 
the Court further noted that the law will afford relief to a proprietor 
whose goodwill has been impaired wrongly. The Court then concluded: 
[The nonsigner provision] of the act does not prevent a purchaser of 
the commodity bearing the mark from selling the commodity alone 
at any price he pleases. It interferes only when he sells with the aid 
of the goodwill of the vendor; and it interferes then only to protect 
that goodwill against injury.41 
36 General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, Sl8-19, 296 P.2d 635, 643 (1956) (citations 
omitted). See also Shulman, The Fair Trade Acts and the Law of Restrictive Agreements 
Affecting Chattels, 49 Yale L.J. 607, 616 (1940); FTC Report, supra note 19, 50-52. 
37 See text at note 24 supra. 
88 299 u.s. 183 (1936). 
89 Pep Boys, Inc. v. Pyroil Sales Co., Inc., 299 U.S. 198 (1936) (ruling on the constitu-
tionality of the California Fair Trade Law). 
40 299 U.S. at 194 (citation omitted). 
41 Id. at 195. 
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The Court had, in effect, given a constitutional imprimatur to fair 
trade legislation enacted in the states. However, it should be noted that 
Old Dearborn did not overrule Dr. Miles in even a limited sense since 
the former case approved of fair trade legislation only insofar as it per-
tained to intrastate commerce.42 Where interstate commerce was con-
cerned, the holding of the Dr. Miles case-that fair trade agreements and 
enabling legislation ran contra to the Sherman Act and must therefore 
fall-was still good law. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Old Dearborn has been the subject of 
much confusion and erroneous interpretation. The opinion made two 
important points: first, it recognized a sufficient proprietary interest in 
"goodwill," thereby justifying fair trade legislation;4a and second, it up-
held the law enacted to protect this interest against claims that it ran 
contra to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth· 
Amendment.44 Simply put, Old Dearborn indicated there were no infir-
mities of federal constitutional proportion inherent in the nonsigner 
clauses. With the constitutional hurdle aside, fair trade proponents 
hoped to overrule Dr. Miles by securing federal legislation which would 
provide an antitrust exemption for these state fair trade laws. At both the 
state and the federal level the lobbyists' job was greatly simplified when 
Old Dearborn settled the constitutional challenge. 
In addition, state legislatures were facing ever increasing pressure to 
enact protective legislation, but lawmakers were hesitant in the face of 
the admittedly stringent rule announced in Dr. Miles almost twenty-five 
years earlier. However, encouraged by both the "hands off" policy 
exhibited by the Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,411 and 
the tacit approval in Old Dearborn of both the wisdom and legality of 
state fair trade legislation, twenty-eight states, including Massachusetts, 
adopted fair trade legislation in 1937. 
Again, lobby group activity was especially strong and this fact is 
exemplified by the legislative history of the Massachusetts Fair Trade 
Law. The record indicates that among the sponsors of resale price 
maintenance legislation in Massachusetts were the National Association of 
Tobacco Distributors,46 the Massachusetts Federation of Retail Liquor 
Package Store Dealers, Inc.,47 the Massachusetts State Pharmaceutical 
42 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
43 299 U.S. at 194-95. 
44 Id. 
41! 301 U.S. 1 (1936). In ]ones, the Court upheld the validity of the National Labor 
Relations Act against the contention that it was an invidious constraint on an employer's 
right to bargain freely with his employee. The NLRA prohibited "unfair labor practices" 
in interstate commerce and specifically coercion of employees in their right to self-
organization and their right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing. 
46 1937 Mass. Legis. Doc., Senate No. 122. 
47 1937 Mass. Legis. Doc., Senate No. 296. 
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Association,48 and the Retail Liquor Package Dealers of Massachusetts, 
Inc. 49 These associations operated in much the same manner as the 
National Association of Retail Druggists had operated on a national 
scale. They had a two-fold concern in that they were seeking to preserve 
the then present structure of retail distribution while at the same time 
maintaining a predetermined profit margin.ro "Fair trade" was the 
framework which they needed. 
In 1937 Congress at last provided an antitrust exemption for duly 
enacted state fair trade legislation, with the enactment of the Miller-
Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act.111 The real purpose 
and effect of the bill were unclear to many Congressmen, who exhibited 
a definite reluctance to pass the law at first.52 However, it was added as a 
rider to a much-needed appropriation bill and finally approved.58 The 
act was read as an indication by Congress that it wished the states to 
exercise their concurrent jurisdiction over commerce. It consequently 
rendered the Dr. Miles decision obsolete by providing a legislative 
exemption where a judicial exemption had been refused.54 Henceforth, 
interstate commerce was amenable to state-enacted vertical price fixing 
legislation.lili States which had enacted fair trade legislation were now 
free to enforce such laws, and states which had been reluctant to pass fair 
trade laws were now encouraged to do so. 
Effective fair trade legislation was virtually a universal fact until the 
Supreme Court decision in 1951 in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Dis-
48 19!17 Mass. Legis. Doc., House No. 548. 
49 19!17 Mass. Legis. Doc., House No. !197. 
1!0 See Fulda, supra note 19; Herman, supra note 19; FTC Report, supra note 19, at 
LIV, LVII. 
lil [N]othing contained in §§l-7 [of the Sherman Antitrust Act] shall render 
illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale of a 
commodity which bears . • • the trademark, brand, or name of the producer • • . 
of such commodity and which is in free and open competition with commodities of 
the same general class ••• when such contracts or agreements are lawful as applied 
to intrastate transactions under any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in 
effect in any State • • • • 
15 U.S.C. §I (1970) (emphasis added). 
li2 See Herman, supra note 19, at 6Zl. 
liB The technique of passing the Miller-Tydings Amendment via a rider to an ap-
propriations bill met with some criticism. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 4365 Before the 
Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 199 
(1952), where Mr. James A. Rohl stated: "I think it is fair to say that the legislative 
technique there employed left something of a bad taste in the mouths of otherwise 
impartial observers." 
li4 Vertical price fixing would still be unlawful under the Sherman Act-according to 
Dr. Miles-in those states which did not approve of such price fixing either legislatively 
or judicially. 
lili For a comprehensive examination of the factors leading to the passage of the 
Miller-Tydings Act, see the majority and dissenting opinions in Schwegmann Bros. v. 
Calvert Distillers Corp., lJ41 U.S. !184 (1951). For the legislative history of the Miller-
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tillers Corp." In that case the Supreme Court ruled that the nonsigner 
provisions of fair trade laws were not exempted, by reason of the Miller-
Tydings Act, from the proscriptions of federal antitrust legislation. The 
Court looked to the specific wording of the Miller-Tydings Act,111 which 
provided exemption for "contracts or agreements." Enforcement against 
a nonsigner would be secured under a specific provision of the state 
fair trade law and not pursuant to any "contract or agreement," which 
by definition does not exist between a manufacturer and a nonsigning 
retailer. The words "contract or agreement" could not be reasonably said 
to include the mechanism, wholly statutory, which binds a nonsigner to 
a specific price schedule. liS The -Court went on to say that the practical 
effectiveness of the Sherman Act would be irreparably impaired by a 
ruling to the contrary.G11 Furthermore, the Court inferred from the legis-
lative history of Miller-Tydings that the proposed exemption for non-
signer clauses had been carefully and purposely omitted from the Act.80 
Within a year, however, Congress passed legislation which effectively 
overruled the Schwegmann decision. The McGuire Act61 was enacted in 
1952 as an amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act, and almost 
completely superseded the Miller-Tydings Act. The McGuire Act pro-
vided federal antitrust exemptions for vertical price-fixing agreements 
where they were otherwise lawful, much as the Miller-Tydings Act had 
done. But it took the further step of providing antitrust immunity for 
stipulations enforceable wholly under the nonsigner provisions of resale 
price maintenance legislation.62 
Tydings Act, see 16 F. Von Kalinowski, Business Organizations, Antitrust Laws and 
Trade Regulations 152.0!1[2] (1972). 
116 !141 u.s. !184 (1951). 
liT For text of the Miller-Tydings Act, see note 51 supra. 
118 !141 U.S. at !189-90. 
1111 Id. 
80 Id. at !195. 
61 15 U.S.C. 145(a) (1970). The McGuire Act amended, generally, the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. 
62 Nothing contained in this section or in any of the Antitrust Acts shall render 
unlawful any contracts or agreements prescribing minimum or stipulated prices for 
the resale of a commodity which bears ••• the trade-maxk, brand, or name of the 
producer or distributor of such commodity and which is in free and open competi-
tion with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others, 
fllhen conmu:t.s or agreements of that descril'tion are lawful as applied to intra-
state transactions under any statute, law or public policy • • • in effect in any 
state ••• in which such resale is to be made or to which the commodity is to be 
transported for such resale. 
15 U.S.C. §45(a)(2) (1970) (emphasis added). 
Nothing contained in this section or in any of the Antitrust Acts shall render 
unlawful the exercise or the enforcement of any right or right of action created 
by any statute, law, or public policy ••• in effect in any State • • • which in sub-
stance provides that wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling 
any commodity at less than the prices prescribed in such contracts or agreements 
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The passage of the McGuire Act indicates the apparent high water 
mark for fair trade legislation. However, twenty-five states have, since 
1952, seen fit to overrule the nonsigner provisions of their respective fair 
trade laws as violative, for one reason or another, of their constitutions.63 
It appears that the Schwegmann decision has given no small impetus 
to this movement in spite of the fact that Schwegmann was rendered in-
operative by the McGuire Act. State courts were hoping for at least sub 
silentio criticism of the Old Dearborn decision, and they looked, 
logically, to the United States Supreme Court for guidance. The courts 
found that guidance in the Court's language in Schwegmann: 
When they [manufacturers] seek, however, to impose price fixing on 
persons who have not contracted or agreed to the scheme, the situa-
tion is vastly different. That is not price fixing by contract or agree-
ment; that is price fixing by compulsion. That is not following the 
path of consensual agreement; that is resort to coercion.64 
Admittedly the language is strong, and it suggests that nonsigner pro-
visions do in fact visit a deprivation of liberty of constitutional propor-
tions upon nonsigners. But whatever the statement is, it is nothing more 
than dicta under the facts of the case. The sole question in Schwegmann 
was whether or not the Miller-Tydings Act exempted nonsigner clauses 
from federal antitrust legislation. That narrow issue of law was subcon-
whether the person ••• is or is not a party to such a contract or agreement, is un-
fair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby. 
15 U.S.C. §45(a)(~) (1970) (emphasis added). 
63 Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 274 Ala. 270, 147 So. 2d 797 (1962); Union 
Carbide &: Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., Inc., 224 Ark. 558, 274 S.W .2d 
455 (1955); Olin Mathieson Chern. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, ~01 P.2d 1~9 (1956); 
Cox v. General Elec. Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 S.E.2d 514 (1955); Bulova Watch Co. v. Albert-
son's, Inc., 196~ Trade Cas. ~ 70,596 (Sup. Ct., Idaho); Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. 
Shane Co., 2!17 Ind. 188, 14~ N.E.2d 415 (1957); Bulova Watch Co. v. Robinson Wholesale 
Co., 252 Iowa 740, 108 N.W.2d M5 (1961); Quality Oil Co. v. E. I. DuPont de 
Nemours&: Co., 182 Kan. 488, ~22 P.2d 7~1 (1958); General Elec. Co. v. American Buyers 
Cooperative, Inc., ~16 S.W .2d M4 (Ky. 1958); Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. 
Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 2!11 La. 51, 90 So. 2d M~ (1968); Shakespeare 
Co. v. Lippmann's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., ~~4 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 
(1952); Remington Arms Co. v. G.E.M., Inc., 257 Minn. 562, 102 N.W.2d 528 (1960); 
Union Carbide &: Carbon Corp. v. Skaggs Drug Center, Inc., 1~9 Mont. 15, ~59 P.2d 
644 (1961); McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis &: Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 70~, 65 N.W .2d 620 
(1955); Zale-Las Vegas, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., SO Nev. 48~, ~96 P.2d 68~ (1964); 
Skaggs Drug Center, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957); 
American Home Prods. Corp. v. Homsey 361 P.2d 297 (Okla. 1961); General Elec. Co. v. 
Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 6~5 (1956); Olin Mathieson Chern. Corp. v. White Cross 
Stores, Inc., 414 Pa. 95, 199 A.2d 266 (1964); Rogers Kent, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 231 
S.C. 636, 99 S.E.2d 665 (1957); House of Seagram, Inc. v. Assam Drug Co., 85 S.D. 27, 
176 N.W.2d 491 (1970); General Elec. Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Inc., 5 Utah 2d 326, ~01 P.2d 
741 (1956); Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs, 55 Wash. 2d 1, 345 P.2d 1085 (1958); General 
Elec. Co. v. A. Dandy Appliance Co., 143 W.Va. 491, 10~ S.E.2d 310 (1958); Bulova Watch 
Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 1962). 
64 341 U.S. at 388. 
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stitutional in proportion, and yet the language quoted above has been 
relied upon by many state courts in holding nonsigner provisions con· 
trary to the state constit_ution.61i For example, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court noted in Corning that the Schwegmann language under-
mined, if it did not overrule, the Old Dearborn rationale that "voluntary 
acquisition of the property with such knowledge [of the restriction] 
carried with it upon every principle of fair dealing assent to the protec-
tive restriction ... ,"66 
It must be remembered that the fair trade laws were born during the 
Depression and, whatever their rationale, they served an arguably useful 
purpose at the time. They were one method used to prevent desperate and 
injurious price cutting. By the early 1950's the Depression had long 
since passed and the economic factors which argued for the legality of 
such provisions were gone. The United States Supreme Court, cognizant 
of the fact that its prestige had suffered badly during and after its series 
of decisions invalidating New Deal legislation,67 had begun to articulate 
a judicial "hands off" policy in Old Dearborn, which policy culminated 
in the NLRB v. ]ones b Lauglin Steel Corp.6s decision one year later. By 
1952, the image of the Court had been restored, and there was consider-
ably less political pressure to render a decision that would leave fair trade 
legislation intact in spite of arguable constitutional infirmities. Schweg-
mann indicated that the Court would, much as it had before 1936, make 
some critical evaluation of the efficacy of economic legislation, though the 
narrow holding in Schwegmann is based solely on the Court's construc-
tion of the language in the Miller-Tydings Act. It appears that state 
courts have taken a cue from, among other things, the dicta in Schweg-
mann.69 However, it is also true that where the issue has presented itself 
the Supreme Court has declined to overrule Old Dearborn specifically.7° 
II. FAIR TRADE As AN INVALID EXERcisE OF PoLicE PowER 
It is appropriate at this point to examine some of the state court 
decisions invalidating fair trade laws, specifically as they compare to the 
611 See generally cases cited in note 6ll supra. 
66 Corning Glass Works v. Ann Be Hope, Inc., 197ll Mass. Adv. Sh. 575, 580, 294 N.E.2d 
354, 358, quoting Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 18ll, 
19!1-94 (19!16). 
67 See note ll4 supra. 
68 ll01 U.S. 1 (1936). See note 45 supra. 
69 See Note, 47 Iowa L Rev. 208, 214 (1961). 
70 The Supreme Court has declined to review a number of decisions on the ground 
that they lacked a substantial federal question. E.g., Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson 
Stores, Inc., 15 N.J. 191, 104 A.2d 304, appeal dismissed, ll48 U.S. 859 (1954); General 
E1ec. Co. v. Masters, Inc., ll07 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 807, appeal dismissed, ll48 U.S. 892 
(1954). See also Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. New Cut Rate Liquors, Inc., 221 F.2d 815, 
820 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ll50 U.S. 828 (1955); Standard Drug Co. v. General Elec. Co., 
202 Va. ll67, 117 S.E.2d 289 (1961), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 4 (1961). 
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Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Corning. There are two principal 
methods which state courts have used to obtain a constitutional "handle" 
on the allegedly offensive elements in fair trade legislation: first, chal-
lenged fair trade laws have been held to be an unconstitutional exercise 
of police power; and second, other such laws have been held to be un-
constitutional delegations of legislative authority. This section of the 
comment will analyze those decisions which turn on the police power 
issue.71 These opinions involve an examination of the merits and effects 
of the nonsigner provision. The nonsigner provision, as a vehicle for 
economic regulation, is then evaluated in light of state constitutional 
provisions which hold that all laws, to be within the power of the legis-
lature, must bear a rational relationship to the general well-being of the 
public. Economic regulations that clearly transgress the legitimate sphere 
of police authority work, ipso facto, a deprivation of liberty or property 
without due process of law. As will be subsequently shown, these deci-
sions are based on due process provisions contained in the respective 
state constitutions and not on the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. However, every court must initially examine the problem 
as it relates to the federal due process provision applicable to the states 
as well as to individual due process provisions contained in state con-
stitutions. 
The federal due process test was articulated in the landmark case of 
Nebbia v. New York12 where the United States Supreme Court said: 
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the 
absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt 
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote 
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to 
its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such 
policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If 
the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper 
legislative purpose and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, 
the requirements of due process are satisfied . . . ;ra 
With specific regard to fair trade legislation, the argument that such 
legislation works a deprivation of property without due process of law, as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, was answered in Old 'Dear-
born: 
71 See, e.g., Remington Arms Co. v. G.E.M., Inc., 257 Minn. 562, 102 N.W.2d 528 
(1960); General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. !102, 296 P.2d 655 (1956); Olin Mathieson 
Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 1!14 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956); Shakespeare Co. v. Lippmann's 
Tool and Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952). 
72 291 U.S. 502 (1934). In this case the New York Legislature had established a 
3-member commission to set prices for milk that would be calculated to yield both the 
producer and the dealer a reasonable return and which insured an adequate supply of 
milk. Petitioner sold milk below minimum prices established by the board. 
78 Id. at 537. 
37
Duerre and Moore: Chapter 10: Commercial Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1973
274 1973 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §10.15 
Appellants here acquired the commodity in question with full 
knowledge of the then-existing restriction in respect of price which 
the producer and wholesale dealer had imposed, and, of course, 
with presumptive, if not actual knowledge of the law which author-
ized the restriction • . • . (T]heir voluntary acquisition of the prop-
erty with such knowledge carried with it, upon every principal of 
fair dealing, assent to the protective restriction .... '14 
To the extent that Old Dearborn is s.till viable law, this language is 
determinative of the federal due process argument. As previously stated, 
the Supreme Court has declined on numerous occasions to review this 
holding.'lll Citing Old Dearborn and subsequent decisions upholding that 
case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court felt compelled to question 
its present validity: 
[S]ubsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
though without rationale, make it clear that such assertions [depriva-
tions of property without due process of law] present no substan-
tial Federal question .... We are bound by decisions of the Su-
preme Court on Federal questions, regardless of rationale or lack 
thereof.76 
The Massachusetts court is simply at a loss to explain the silence of the 
Supreme Court. 
Another state court, that of Oregon, flatly ignored the implications of 
Old Dearborn when in General Elec. Co. v. Wahle" it said: 
We are convinced that the Fair Trade Act as it applies to non-
signers constitutes an unnecessary and unreasonable interference 
with an individual's constitutional right of contract and of prop-
erty in violation of ... the Oregon constitution, and of the due 
process clause of the federal constitution.'ls 
It would seem that this is in direct contradiction to the Old Dearborn 
decision.79 It would further appear that where so many state courts are 
either confused or unpersuaded by Old Dearborn and its descendant cases 
'14 Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. ISS, 193-94 (19!16). 
'Ill See note 70 supra. 
'16 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 575, 580-81, 294 N.E.2d 354, 358 (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
'1'1 207 Ore. 302, 296 P .2d 6lJ5 (1956). 
'18 Id. at 326, 296 P.2d at 647. 
'19 It was not vital to the holding in Wahle that the Oregon court find the nonsigner 
provision in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was enough that it clearly 
contravened certain provisions of the state constitution. A court may say it is "convinced" 
of a legal conclusion and yet the decision in the case will not require the conclusion. 
Thus, the Wahle court was not·really attempting to hold contra to the United States 
Supreme Court on a constitutional issue. 
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that the United States Supreme Court would take an opportunity to 
clarify the law. Most courts have been unwilling to venture as far as the 
Oregon court did in 1956. Certainly the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court evinced in Corning a reluctance to disregard Old Dearborn 
though the wisdom of the 1936 decision was severely questioned. 
The holding in Old Dearborn, even when followed, is not dispositive 
of the due process argument in state courts, where both federal and state 
due process tests must be passed. The Supreme Court of the United 
States cannot, of course, define the police power of the states as limited by 
state constitutions. This involves an examination of those provisions in 
the various state constitutions which correspond to the due process 
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. In Coffee-Rich Inc. v. Commis-
sioner of Public Health,&o the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
observed: "What is permissible under the Federal Constitution in matters 
of state economic regulation is not necessarily permissible under state 
law. The Constitution of a state may guard more jealously against the 
exercise of the state's police power."81 It is true that state constitutional 
due process provisions are sometimes said to be, at the least, co-extensive 
with the federal due process provisions,s2 but the determination of the 
scope of these provisions is properly left to a case-by-case definition. No 
less than sixteen states have overturned nonsigner clauses as being beyond 
the scope of the police power of the legislature as delimited by the due 
pro~ss requirement in the state constitution.ss In Corning, the Massa-
chusetts court was unwilling so to rule. Some comparisons may be help-
ful. 
The numerous opinions which hold that nomigner clauses are violative 
of due process and are beyond the scope of the police power of the states 
involve lengthy discussion of the relative merits of the law. The origins 
of the legislation are scrutinized and its operation is examined. Certain 
of these decisions have reached the conclusion that fair trade is not what 
it purports to be, that is, it is not designed to protect the goodwill that 
inheres in a trademark, but rather is a measure to insure maintenance 
of profit margins for the small retailer. To the extent that these laws are 
in derogation of free and open competition and serve only to further the 
aim of special interests, they are found to be outside the legitimate sphere 
of police authority. 
In Wahle the Oregon court discussed the legitimacy of the objective of 
the challenged fair trade law: 
so M8 Mass. 414, 204 N.E.2d 281 (1965). 
81 Id. at 421, 204 N.E.2d at 286. See also Hutcheson v. Director of Civil Service, 1972 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 651, 660, 281 N.E.2d 5!1, 59; Minnesota v. National Tea Co., !109 U.S. 
551 (1940). 
a See Lowell Gas Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, !124 Mass. 80, 84 N.E.2d 811 
(1949). 
sa See note 71 supra. 
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In substance, what is the real purpose of the Fair Trade Act? 
Regardless of how its true nature may be camouflaged • . . it is a 
matter of common knowledge that it is a price-fixing statute designed 
principally to destroy competition at the retail level Protection of 
the "good will" of the trademark owner is simply an excuse and not 
a reason for the law." 
The Oregon court concludes that the enactment of the nonsigner pro-
vision bears no substantial connection to the general public welfare and 
therefore works a deprivation of due process of law. The numerous 
opinions which hold that fair trade legislation is outside the police power 
of the state and violative of due process are characterized by similar 
discussions.a11 However, the Corning court was unwilling to engage in a 
similar process, dismissing the argument that the nonsigner clause bear 
no relation to the general well-being wi.th these words: 
Disputes of this type are regularly and properly resolved in the 
political and legislative arenas ...• Nor is trial of such issues by a 
hearing officer, judge or jury likely to arrive at the truth • • • • "If 
the question is fairly debatable we cannot substitute our judgment 
for that of the Legislature." • . • [T]he Legislature could rationally 
conclude that authorization of resale price maintenance serves the 
public interest.as 
It seems that the Massachusetts court and others that have refused to 
pass on the wisdom of fair trade legislationBT are on firmer ground. The 
opinions which follow the Michiganaa and Oregon89 rationale raise a 
number of problems. First of all, they violate the basic tenet that courts 
should not substitute their judgment for that of the legislature. It is 
properly the function of the legislature to choose between two arguably 
wise courses of action, and the court may then determine whether a 
challenged law meets specific constitutional requirements. Courts follow-
ing the Michigan and Oregon rationale are required to pass on the eco-
nomic merits of fair trade legislation and thus assume, to some degree, the 
legislative function. They conclude in summary fashion by holding that 
84 207 Ore. at !117, 296 P.2d at 64!1. 
SIS See note 71 supra. 
86 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 584-85, 294 N.E.2d at !160 (citation omitted), quoting General 
Elec. Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, Inc., !1!1!1 Mass. 665, 675, 1!12 N.E.2d 652, 658 (1956). 
87 See note 92 infra. 
88 Shakespeare Co. v. Lippmann's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., !1!14 Mich. 109, 
54 N.W.2d 268 (1952). This waa the fint opinion which held the enforcement of a non-
signer clause invalid solely because it waa an improper exercise of the police power of 
the state. The Florida court had ruled in 1949 that a nonsigner provision was both a 
denial of due process and an invalid delegation of legislative authority. See Liquor 
Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d !171 (Fla. 1949). 
89 General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. !102, 296 P.2d 6!15 (1956). 
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their respective fair trade laws bear no relation to the general public 
well-being, an extreme conclusion which may not be warranted by the 
evidence. Furthermore, the fact that many state courts find the question 
of the wisdom of these laws, in fact debatable, suggests that there may be 
some logical nexus between the fair trade laws and the general public 
well-being. Current opinion seems to run contra to resale price main· 
tenance but the question is by no means closed. The fact that sixteen 
statesDO have upheld nonsigner provisions is indicative of the vigorous 
debate involved here. It is simply unconvincing to hold that these laws are 
so irrational as to preclude debate. 
Second, arguments which rest on the scope of the police power must 
inevitably conclude that nonsigner provisions work a deprivation of 
property without due process of law. State courts taking this approach 
must choose one of two alternatives. First, they can specifically disap-
prove of Old Dearborn, in effect reconsidering the status of fair trade 
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But clearly 
this is improper, as state courts are bound by Supreme Court opinions 
on questions of federal law. Alternatively, the court, may try to articulate 
some distinction between the federal due process clause and the corre-
sponding provision in the state constitution. If the distinctions are found 
by the courts to be persuasive then, a fortiori, the nonsigner provision may 
be valid under federal law but invalid under state law. However, the 
arguments in support of these distinctions are inevitably weak. Often 
they will say nothing more than that the court is not constrained by 
federal discussions when interpreting its own constitution. This is un· 
doubtedly sound reasoning, but it seems to be of little aid in reconciling 
the federal and state decisions. 
Finally, it should be noted that there has been a general demise of 
substantive due process objections in the area of economic regulation 
since the mid 1930's. This has been quite pronounced in the federal 
<;ourts and operates to a substantial degree in the state courts.91 Decisions 
holding the Michigan and Oregon view undermine this trend. On the 
other hand, Corning and similar decisions avoid resurrecting substantive 
due process issues. 
III. THE CoRNING DECISION 
A growing number of states92 have seen fit to invalidate nonsigner pro-
visions on the theory that they are an unconstitutional delegation of 
90 Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Dlinois, Maryland, Mississip-
pi, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee and Wisconsin. 
91 See Conant, Resale Price Maintenance: Constitutionality of Nonsigner Clauses, 109 
U. Pa. L Rev. 5!19, 545 (1961). 
92 See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. Robinson Wholesale Co.,. 252 Iowa 740, 108 
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legislative authority to private persons. That is, they allow a manu-
facturer to fix prices at which a retailer, not in privity with the manu-
facturer, must sell. This involves a comparison of the fair trade law 
being challenged with the appropriate state constitutional provisions 
which usually provide, in essence, that the legislature is the sole repository 
of lawmaking authority. This approach has an advantage in that it 
obviates a discussion of the scope of the police power, an area admittedly 
laced with political considerations. At the same time, these decisions 
have a solid foundation in law, and are not merely poorly reasoned 
opinions prompted by a basic skepticism of the economic wisdom of 
fair trade. The argument that a nonsigner clause is an invalid delegation 
of legislative authority is not a judicial disguise for a political decision. 
Decisions, like Corning, invalidating fair trade laws as violative of the 
nondelegation doctrine have proliferated only recently98 due to a num-
ber of factors. Chief of these has been the United States Supreme Court 
decision in 0 ld Dearborn, which unfortunately has been widely mis-
interpreted on the narrow issue of delegation of power.H It is true that 
the Court there did make the broad statement: "We find nothing in 
this situation to justify the contention that there is an unlawful delega-
tion of power to private persons to control the disposition of the prop-
erty of others .... "911 In its decision, in 1956, in General Electric Co. v. 
Kimball jewelers, Inc.,96 the Supreme Judicial Court cited the above 
quoted language from Old Dearborn as dispositive of the question of im-
proper delegation. 97 The General Electric holding on this issue was in 
harmony with decisions in New York,98 Pennsylvania,99 New Jerseytoo 
N.W.2d 865 (1961); Quality Oil Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours&: Co., 182 Kan. 488, 822 
P.2d 781 (1958); Olin Mathieson Chern. Corp. v. White Cross Stores, Inc., 414 Pa. 95, 199 
A.2d 266 (1964); House of Seagram, Inc. v. Assam Drug Co., 85 S.D. 27, 176 N.W.2d 491 
(1970). See also Note, 47 Iowa L. Rev. 208, 211 (1961). 
93 There have been nine such decisions since 1958. See Bulova Watch Co. v. Albert-
son's Inc., 1968 Trade Cas. 1f 70~96 (Sup. Ct., Idaho); Bulova Watch ~. v. Robinson 
Wholesale Co., 252 Iowa 740, 108 N.W .2d 865 (1961); Quality Oil Co. v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours&: Co., 182 Kan. 488, 822 P.2d 781 (1958); Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. 
v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 281 La. 51.-90 So. 2d 848 (1968); Remington 
Arms Co. v. G.E.M., Inc., 257 Minn. 562, 102 N.W.2d 528 (1960); American Home Prods. 
Corp. v. Homsey, 861 P.2d 297 (Okla. 1961); Olin Mathieson Chern. Corp. v. White 
Cross Stores, Inc., 414 Pa. 95, 199 A.2d 266 (1964): House of Seagram, Inc. v. Assam 
Drug Co., 85 S.D. 27, 176 N.W.2d 491 (1970); Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., !171 
P .2d 409 (Wyo. 1962). 
94 See I K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §2.14 (1958). See generally Dr. G. H. 
Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 281 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 
848 (1968): Conant, supra note 90, at 548-49; Note, 10 Vand. L R.ev. 415, 417 (1957). 
911 299 U.S. at 194. 
96 888 Mass. 665, 182 N.E.2d 652 (1956). 
97 Id. at 677-78, lll2 N.E.2d at 659. 
98 Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 278 N.Y. 167, 7 N.E.2d llO (1987), followed in Gen-
eral Elec. Co. v. Masters, lp.c., 807 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 802 (1954). 
99 Burche Co. v. General Elec. Co., !182 Pa. 870, 115 A.2d 861 (1955). Burche has been 
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and California.101 Nevertheless, it is quite clear that Old Dearborn can-
not be dispositive of the issue of delegation of legislative authority vis-
a-vis state constitutional law. Consonant with our concept of federalism, 
it is properly the task of the court of last resort in each state to determine 
whether its own fair trade law contravenes the state constitution. Un-
fortunately, the language in Dearborn102 is unequivocal on this issue of 
delegation of legislative authority. The discussion is not couched in terms 
of the limitation the Fourteenth Amendment places on a state delegation 
of legislative authority, but rather is a bare statement that fair trade does 
not involve an unconstitutional delegation of authority to private per-
sons. While the language, when placed in proper context as a declaration 
by a federal court not reaching questions of state law, is not erroneous, it 
is misleading. 
Granting the foregoing, we must reexamine the scope and implications 
of Old Dearborn in order to accord that decision its proper application in 
this area. As has already been mentioned, Old Dearborn was attempting 
to grapple with the due process objections raised by fair trade legislation. 
That case seems to recognize that there may be particular instances of 
delegation of state legislative authority which are so unnecessary, so 
broad, and so arbitrary as to be wanting in due process of law as required 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Old Dearborn did not have to define the 
limits of this due process restraint on the delegation of state legislative 
authority. 
It does not follow, ipso facto, that the delegation involved in Corning 
comports with those provisions of the state constitution which make the 
General Court the sole repository of legislature authority.10& Properly, 
this would involve a de novo consideration of the matter, without refer-
ence to the due process argument of Old Dearborn. And this is exactly 
the approach the Supreme Judicial Court took in the Corning decision. 
The court was unwilling to perpetuate the mistake made in General 
Electric104 but neither was it willing to admit in so many words the 
earlier Court's interpretative error. Corning is at most a sub silentio ad-
mission of mistake.1o11 Cases following General Electric, but prior to 
Corning had failed to correct the mistake, but the majority of these were 
subsequently overruled by Olin Mathieson Chern. Corp. v. White Cross Stores, Inc., 
414 Pa. 95, 199 A.2d 266 (1964), which held the nonsigner provision of the Pennsylvania 
Fair Trade Law an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. 
100 Johnson Be Johnson v. Weissbard, 121 N.J. Eq. 585, 191 A. 87!1 (19!17), followed in 
Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 15 N.J. 191, 104 A.2d !104 (1954). 
101 Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Skaggs Pay Less Drug Stores, 45 Cal. 2d 881, 291 P.2d 9!16 
(1955); Max Factor Be Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 2d 446, 55 P.2d 177 (1936). 
102 See text at note 44 supra. 
103 Mass. Const. pt. I, art. XXX; Mass. Const. pt. II, ch. 1, §1, art. IV. See note 5 
supra. 
104 See text at note 95 supra. 
1011 Consider the following language in Coming: 
43
Duerre and Moore: Chapter 10: Commercial Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1973
280 1973 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETI'S LAW §10.15 
decided on other than constitutional grounds,106 and did not properly 
re-open the question. 
Once the basic error of the General Electric decision was admitted, 
the question of delegation of power raised by the Massachusetts Fair 
Trade Law had to be reexamined in considerably greater depth. The 
issue was ripe for decision in Corning. When examining a legislative en-
actment challenged on the ground that it is an unlawful delegation of 
legislative authority two questions arise. The first asks whether in fact a 
delegation exists at all. If a delegation is found the second asks whether 
the delegation meets certain requirements thereby making it a lawful 
delegation. 
Although there are opinions to the contrary, the growing feeling among 
state courts is that these laws do involve a delegation to private persons 
of the legislative authority to control prices when conditions demand. 
Professor Kenneth Davis, a noted commentator on administrative law, 
has said that fair trade laws, and specifically nonsigner provisions, un-
questionably involve a delegation of legislative authority to private 
persons.tOT On this point, the Corning court cites Professor Davis with 
approval.tos One court109 has gone so far as to refer to manufacturers who 
can effectively restrict resale prices as "unrestrained sovereign[s]."110 
As noted before, there are opinions directly contra which hold that 
these laws are complete upon enactment and leave no legislative powers 
In [General Electric] we dealt separately with the question whether the "fair 
trade" law constituted an unlawful delegation of power to the owner of the trade 
mark or brand, and concluded that it did not •... Thus [in General Electric] we 
relied primarily on the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Old Dearborn case. 
197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 585-86, 294 N.E.2d at !160-61. The court then cites Davis for the 
proposition that, in spite of all that is said, these laws do involve a delegation of legisla-
tive power. Id. at 586, 294 N.E.2d at !161, citing 1 K. Davis, supra note 94, §2.14. The 
court was somewhat mystified at the reliance General Electric placed on Old Dearborn 
but the court stops short of saying that the reliance was unfounded, or obviously mis-
placed. 
106 E.I. DuPont de Nemours&: Co. v. Kaufman &: Chernick, Inc., !1!17 Mass. 216, 148 
N.E.2d 6!14 (1958) (the constitutional question was never argued); Colgate-Palmolive Co. 
v. Elm Farm Foods Co., !1!17 Mass. 221, 148 N.E.2d 861 (1958) (sole issue was whether 
the issuance of trading stamps violated the presumptively valid law); Shulton, Inc. v. 
Consumer Value Stores, Inc., !152 Mass. 605, 227 N.E.2d 482 (1967) (sole issue argued 
was what constitutes fair and open competition under the statute); Black 8c Decker Mfg. 
Co. v. Ann 8c Hope, Inc., 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 143, 277 N.E.2d 687 (sole issue argued 
was whether contracts stipulating only minimum prices were enforceable against non-
signers). 
101 I K. Davis, supra note 94, at 147. 
tos Corning Glass Works v. Ann 8c Hope, Inc., 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. 575, 586, 294 N.E.2d 
!154, !161. 
109 Olin Mathieson Chern. Corp. v. White Cross Stores, Inc., 414 Pa. 95, 199 A.2d 266 
(1964). 
110 Id. at 99-100, 199 A.2d at 268. 
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in the hands of private persons.m Those courts which hold that fair 
trade laws are not delegatory but are complete upon enactment usually 
point to the element of contract involved. These opinions generally hold 
that acquisition of a commodity with knowledge of the resale restriction 
placed upon the commodity constitutes assent to the contract. Again, 
courts have looked to the language in Old Dearborn: 
Appellants [retailers] here acquired the commodity in question 
with full knowledge of the then-existing restriction in respect of 
price which the producer and wholesale dealer had imposed and, 
of course, with the presumptive if not actual knowledge of the law 
which authorized the restriction. Appellants were not obliged to 
buy; and their voluntary acquisition of the property with such 
knowledge carried with it, upon every principle of fair dealing, 
assent to the protective restriction .... 112 
By this reasoning retailers are deemed to have waived their right to resell 
at any price and have entered an agreement to resell pursuant to the 
producer's predetermined prices. 
It is submitted that the vast majority of these laws do not impose 
contracts by operation of law either implicitly or explicitly.118 Rather the 
111 See, e.g., Eli Lilly Be Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939), where the 
court stated: 
[W]e do not understand that it is contended there is any delegation of the 
legislative function • • • • The statute was complete when it left the hands of the 
Legislature. It required no person or group of persons or other external agency 
to further authorize it or put it in force. 
Id. at 176, 4 S.E.2d at 5!17. See also Coming Glass Works v. Max Dichter Co., 102 N.H. 
505, 161 A.2d 569 (1964), in which the New Hampshire court said: "the law is complete 
as to purpose and general policies. It requires no persons or agencies to make it eftective." 
Id. at 511, 161 A.2d at 574. 
Opinions such as these appear to consist of little more than a statement of conclusion 
on this very important point. This is, no doubt, influenced by the rather inconclusive 
and terse treatment given the issue in Old De~rbom. However, these opinions may also 
be influenced by a narrow view as to what constitutes a delegation of legislative 
authority. It is true that the law is complete upon enactment in the sense that its 
operation is not contingent upon approval or disapproval by private parties. Cf. Trustees 
of Phillips Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 92 N.H. 473, 53 A.2d 665 (1943). 
112 299 U.S. at 193-94 (emphasis added). 
118 But see Va. Code Ann. §59.1-2(10) (1975), which provides: 
"Contract" means any agreement, written or verbal, or actual notice imparted by 
mail or attached to the commodity or containers thereof. The acceptance of a 
commodity for resale, after notice imparted by mail or attached to the commodity 
or containers thereof, shall be prima facie evidence of actual notice of the terms 
of the "contract." Acceptance for resale with actual notice shall be deemed to be 
assent to the terms of the "contract." 
A note following this section goes on to explain: 
When ••• [159.1-2(10)) and 59.1-3 [provisions which allow resale price main-
tenance contracts as a matter of policy] are considered it is quite obvious that 
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courts reason that upon acquisition of a commodity with knowledge of 
the price restriction, a contract is created, the existence of which cannot 
be challenged by the retailer. Generally, this approach is undesirable. It 
is one thing for the legislature to raise a presumption, explicitly stated, 
which is based on certain findings of fact. It is quite another thing for 
a court to gloss a statute so as to establish that in all cases in which the 
minimum conditions (voluntary acquisition and notice of restriction) 
are met there is raised an irrebuttable presumption that an enforceable 
contract exists. Stated otherwise, it seems impermissible for the courts in 
these cases to create the operation of law which establishes a contract be-
tween a producer and a non-signing retailer; this is legislating. Further, 
in light of due process constraints there is substantial doubt as to 
whether even the legislature can act in a manner such as this.114 Once 
the notice is not •.. the contract .•.. Voluntary acceptance of the commodity for 
resale with actual notice of the imposed minimum retail price creates the contract. 
Standard Drug Co. v. General Elec. Co., 202 Va. !167, 117 S.E.2d 289 (1960) •••• 
The entire agreement made between the manufacturer of the trade-marked com-
modity and the retailer, embodying the restriction as to its minimum retail price, 
is not imposed by law; it is voluntary, and the agreement constitutes a contract 
within the meaning of pertinent federal and state legislation. Standard. Drug Co. 
v. General Elec. Co., 202 Va. !167, 117 S.E.2d 289 (1960). 
It is difficult to see how the commentator can say the agreement with a nonsigner is not 
imposed by law. Under the statutory scheme a retailer cannot, at once, purchase a 
restricted item having notice of the restriction and deny that he has agreed to the 
stipulated price restriction. Clearly, purchase with notice raises an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of agreement, and to that extent the contract is imposed by operation of 
law. If the contract were not imposed by operation of law, a retailer might introduce 
evidence (putting aside, for the moment, parol evidence problems) tending to show that 
no such agreement ever existed. See A. Corbin, Contracts §9 (1952). Clearly, this is not 
the case since the objecting retailer is estopped to deny an "agreement." 
See also Ohio Rev. Code §lll!l!l.28(1), which provides: 
"Contract" means any agreement writen or verbal or arising from the acts of the 
parties. The establishment by a proprietor of a minimum resale price for any 
commodity pursuant to the provisions of §1!1!1!1.29 [permitting vertical price fixing 
agreements as a matter of policy] . • • and the proprietor's permission for a dis-
tributor to acquire and use the proprietor's interest in the trade-mark or trade 
name in reselling the commodity shall constitute a contract • . • • Any distribu-
tor • • • who, with notice that the proprietor has established a minimum resale 
price for a commodity, accepts such commodity shall thereby have entered into an 
agreement with such proprietor not to resell such commodity at less than the mini-
mum price stipulated therefor by such proprietor. 
This statute is only slightly different from the Virginia statute. It seems clear that 
these statutes impose certain contracts or agreements by operation of law. Where such 
is the case, there can be no problem of unlawful delegation of legislative authority as 
parties to a contract may stipulate whatever they wish subject only to certain policy 
constraints. The real problem with these laws seems to be that they raise a legal pre-
sumption which may not be generally supported by the facts. Where there is no 
rational relationship between the facts at hand and the ultimate fact presumed, the 
presumption denies due process of law. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (19!14); 
James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 275 U.S. 119 (1927). 
114 See note 115 supra. 
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the court is satisfied that the fair trade law approves solely contracts or 
agreements, and that these contracts or agreements are valid, then no 
problem of invalid delegation arises. 
The Corning court turned its back on this type of reasoning. There 
is no indication that the Massachusetts law creates contracts between 
manufacturers and retailers by operation of law. The statute cannot 
reasonably be construed to do so.n11 The manufacturer is given the right, 
upon execution of a single contract, to impose price restrictions on all 
unwilling retailers. 
If, therefore, it is concluded that the law delegates legislative authority 
to private persons, the second question arises as to whether the delega-
tion is so obnoxious as to violate the state constitution. Art. XXX of 
the Declaration of Human Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution 
articulates the separation of powers between the three branches of the 
state government,116 while part II, ch. I, §1, art. IV makes the General 
Court the sole repository of law-making authority in the Common-
wealth.117 The latter provision, however, cannot be construed too re-
strictively since any workable system of government must permit some 
delegation of rulemaking authority lest the legislative process break 
down under the sheer magnitude of its own weight.us Expedience de-
mands that substantial authority and discretion be vested outside of the 
legislature proper. While there are numerous Massachusetts decisions 
which hold that the legislature may not delegate its lawmaking au-
thority,119 this is a statement of theory and not of fact.120 Each case in-
volving a purported delegation of legislative authority must be examined 
separately. 
Corning involved a delegation of legislative authority to private per-
sons, a delegation that must be extremely suspect on its face. However, 
this does not ipso facto render the delegation invalid. For example, 
Trumper v. City of Quincy,121 a Massachusetts case, upheld a law122-
providing that no change of any zoning ordinance shall be adopted over 
the written protest of owners of twenty percent of the affected land-
against the contention that it was an invalid delegation of legislative 
authority to private persons. The written protest could be overridden 
by a three-quarters vote of the city council, a mechanism which provided 
1111 See note 2 supra. 
116 See note 5 supra. 
117 See note 5 supra. 
118 See generally 1 K. Davis, supra note 94, §2.15. 
119 See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 286 Mass. 611, 191 N.E. !3 (1934); Attleboro Trust 
Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. 8c Taxation, 257 Mass. 43, 153 N.E. 333 (1926); Wyeth 
v. Thomas, 200 Mass. 474, 86 N.E. 925 (1909). 
120 See 1 K. Davis, supra note 94, §2.02. 
121 358 Mass. 311, 264 N.E.2d 689 (1970); see also Godfrey v. Massachusetts Medical 
Serv. 1971 Mass, Adv. Sh. 969, 270 N.E.2d 804. 
122 G.L. c. 40A, §7. 
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for administrative review, and preserved the requisite procedural due 
process. Private organizations as well as individuals have been given 
powers of nomination, and this delegation has been upheld.123 Therefore, 
the fact that a delegation of legislative power is to a private person or 
organization is not dispositive of the issue. 
However, courts have increasingly begun to examine the delegation 
problem in terms of "due process" considerations; that is, where the dele-
gation is so broad as to involve a substantial possibility that the decision-
making mechanism will deny due process of law, the courts have little 
trouble holding such delegations to be unconstitutiona1.124 The Corning 
court was, it will be submitted, particularly concerned with the "due 
process" overtones suggested by the fair trade law in Massachusetts. 
It is readily apparent, as the Supreme Judicial Court recognized, that 
there are no statutory standards enunciated in chapter 93 with which to 
compare the prices established by the manufacturer. In answer to this 
alleged lack of standards, proponents of fair trade argue that market 
factors act to restrain wholly capricious price setting. No producer will 
price himself out of the market. No one can argue with that fact as a bare 
statement, but it deserves further examination. In a market where com-
petition is minimal, a very few producers, conceivably a single producer, 
could, by resorting to fair trade, trigger artificially high prices. Market 
forces cease to be a factor constraining fair trade where these forces are 
not allowed reasonably full play. Fair trade in this type of market can 
dictate those variables which otherwise would militate against the fair 
trade prices established .. 
Furthermore, the lack of standards effectively precludes review of any 
decision made by a manufacturer. There is nothing against which the 
prices he establishes can be compared. He need offer no reasons for the 
action he takes. The Massachusetts Fair Trade Law did not provide for 
administrative review let alone judicial review of the decisions of a 
manufacturer. The law insulates him. 
Perhaps of even greater significance than the lack of statutory stan-
dards is the absence from the Massachusetts Fair Trade Law of proce-
dural due process. Professor Davis is of the view that procedural safe-
guards, in the form of notice and opportunity to be heard, can be a much 
more effective check on arbitrariness than statutory standards.1215 The 
Massachusetts court evidently found this a persuasive argument, for it 
says in Corning: 
There is no provision for participation by any public board or officer 
in the process by which Corning fixes the prices at which Ann 8c Hope 
128 Coming Glass Works v. Ann &: Hope, Inc., 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. 575, 587, 294 
N.E.2d !154,!162. 
124 See I K. Davis, supra note 94, §2.15. 
1211 K. Davis, Administrative Law Text 4!1, 44 (lid ed. 1972). 
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may sell its merchandise, nor for notice, hearing or judicial review 
of the prices fixed by the manufacturer.12s 
Words to the same effect can be found in almost every other opinion127 
which invalidates these laws as an unconstitutional delegation of legis-
lative authority. The general public must be afforded some method of 
review in order to be protected against wholly capricious action on the 
part of a manufacturer. It is not enough to say that retailers and con-
sumers are free to avoid products upon which unreasonable restrictions 
are placed. Even if they could avoid such products, we have not remedied 
or even excused the law in question. 
Summarizing this aspect of the problem, it is apparent that the 
nonsigner provision of the fair trade law effectively allowed a manu-
facturer to establish the price at which all retailers would sell his product. 
While it must be admitted that the Legislature has the authority to 
stipulate prices pursuant to a legitimate state interest, it is quite another 
matter to delegate this authority to a private group of citizens. As has 
been noted, any delegation of legislative authority must preserve due 
process of law for those persons who will be affected by the delegation. 
Accountability. in some form, must inhere in the delegation as a check 
on arbitrariness. Here Coming was accountable to neither the courts, 
nor the legislature, nor the people, in its decision-making process. 
CONCLUSION 
The Corning decision was the logical culmination of a series of deci-
sions handed down by the Supreme Judicial Court. In addition, Corning 
pointed to the growing number of states which have invalidated their laws 
for one reason or another. Because of the growing dissatisfaction the 
courts have been forced to scrutinize these laws very closely. Many juris-
dictions, including Massachusetts, now have an Unfair Sales Act128 the 
availability of which undermines the case for fair trade .. In general, unfair 
·sales acts provide that no retailer may sell an item at less than cost plus a 
minimum statutory mark-up. The express purpose of the laws is to pre-
vent loss-leader selling129 and predatory price cutting. At this they are 
much more exact and palatable than the fair trade laws. The Unfair Sales 
Law enables the producer to protect his goodwill simply by adjusting his 
128 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 588, 294 N.E.2d at !162. 
127 See note 92 supra. 
128 G.L. c. 93, §§14E-K. 
129 Loss-leader selling is the practice often engaged in by large retail outlets whereby 
a specific item is advertised at a price which is at or below cost to attract the customer. 
The customer is then induced in various ways to purchase other items while he is in 
the store. In this manner the store can recoup its loss on the single advertised item. 
Loss leaders mean somewhat higher prices on the remaining items is the store. It is 
argued that in reality the consumer saves nothing when he is made the unwitting 
subject of this deceptive practice. 
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sale price to the retailer. The statutory mark-up, usually around 6%, is 
small enough to allow competition among horizontal components of the 
market. The efficient retailer is still able to pass on the fruits of efficiency 
to the consumer, in the form of lower prices, and the consumer is not re-
quired to subsidize marginal retailers who, but for fair trade, would not 
exist. 
To those who argue that the passing of fair trade will be marked by 
an increase in bankruptcy of small retailers the answer is simply that 
small retailers and independent businessmen offer a variety of services 
which have high market value. People are willing to pay for personalized 
service and attention, and for convenience of location. The small re-
tailer can survive and even prosper if he is efficient in offering these 
services. 
Recent decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court prior to Corning have 
suggested that the fair trade law was looked on with some dissatisfaction. 
In Shulton, Inc. v. Consumer Value Storest8o the court held that there-
quirement that a fair traded item be in free and open competition WilS, 
not established by a notice to admit facts or an agreement between 
parties.1Bl The burden of proving fair and open competition is on the 
plaintiff, a burden that may prove expensive to meet. This had the effect 
of greatly restricting the usefulness of the nonsigner provision of the law. 
More recently the court decided Black &- Decker Manufacturing Co. v. 
Ann & Hope, Inc.,182 in which it was held that a fair trade contract which 
failed to stipulate exact prices was unenforceable against a nonsigner. 
Plaintiff's contracts stipulated that the retailer would not resell at prices 
below those indicated in the contract. The court construed the language 
of section 14B very strictly and found that plaintiff's contracts were not 
included, though clearly they could have held otherwise. The Black & 
Decker decision further noted the number of jurisdictions then holding 
nonsigner provisions unconstitutional, an oblique suggestion that the 
court would at least reconsider the issue, were it properly presented. 
Corning was the final step and brought Massachusetts law into line with 
the law in the majority of other jurisdictions. 
S'I'EPHBN J. KIELY 
SnmENT CoMMENT 
§10.16. Consumer credit transactions: Newly modernized repossession 
procedures: Chapter 629 of the Acts of 1973. 
From the foundation of civil society, two desires, in a measure 
conflicting with one another, have been striving for supremacy: 
180 !52 Mass. 605, 2Z1 N.E.2d 482 (1967); see also note 11 supra. 
181 See text at note 11 supra. 
182 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 143, ?:/7 N.E.2d 687. 
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first, the desire of the individual to control and regulate his own 
activities in such a way as to promote what he conceives to be his 
own good, and, second, the desire of society to curtail the activities 
of the individual in such a way as to promote what it conceives 
to be the common good. 
-George Sutherlandl 
Historically, the law governing commercial transactions has been predi-
cated upon the ability of the individual to act in his own behalf and 
to protect his own interests. Relying upon the assumption that the 
parties to a transaction possessed equal information and negotiated from 
positions of relative equality, the law has allowed the individual free-
dom to control and regulate his own activities, subject to the obligations 
of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care.2 
The recent growth in consumer credit,8 however, has significantly 
altered the composition of the credit market and undercut the assump-
tions upon which freedom in commercial transactions has been premised. 
Consumers are often unable to assess the quality of goods they purchase, 
resist sophisticated, high-pressure sales campaigns, or comprehend the 
complex credit terms which may be offered. Moreover, consumers often 
have no opportunity to negotiate either the price of goods or the terms 
of sales agreements. This lack of information and inability to bargain 
have upset the balance which formerly allowed "freedom of contract" 
principles to dominate commercial transactions. Recognition of this im-
balance has induced both legislative' and judicial11 action designed to 
equalize the position of the consumer with that of the creditor. 
Much of the attention given to consumer credit transactions in recent 
years has focused on the rights of the consumer upon default under a 
conditional sales contract. In August of 1973, the General Court of 
Massachusetts enacted a new repossession statute, chapter 629 of the 
Acts of 1973, which is applicable to consumer credit transactions entered 
into on or after January 1, 1974. The statute repeals and replaces the 
§10.16. 1 Address by George Sutherland, American Bar Association Annual Meeting, 
Sept. 4, 1917, in 8 Modem Eloquence 428 (1936). 
2 G.L. c. 106, §l-102(8) and comment 2. See also G.L. c. 106, §2-802 limiting en-
forcement of contracts or clauses of contracts found to be unconscionable. 
a As of October 81, 1978, outstanding consumer instalment credit exceeded $148 
billion. Financial and Business Statistics, 59 Fed. Res. Bull. A54 (Dec. 1975). 
4 For example, truth-in-lending legislation has been enacted in an attempt to 
provide, through the mechanism of disclosure, the consumer with the information 
necessary to make knowledgeable decisions about credit terms. See G.L. c. 140C and 
15 U.S.C. §1601 et seq. (1970). Other consumer protection legislation has been de-
signed to curtail deceptive advertising, misrepresentation, and high pressure sales 
tactics. See G.L. c. 98A. 
li See, e.g., Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 282 A.2d 405 (1967); Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 850 F .2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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former chapter 255, sections 131 and 18J (dealing with secured loans to 
consumers); chapter 255B, sections 20A and 20B (dealing with secured 
and unsecured retail installment sales of motor vehicles); and chapter 
255D, sections 21 and 22 (dealing with secured and unsecured retail 
installment sales of consumer goods and services other than motor 
vehicles).& 
Under the former chapter 255, the secured creditor, upon default by 
the debtor, had the option to provide the debtor with fourteen days no-
tice, in writing, of his intention to repossess the collateral.' Repossession 
without notice was permitted, and failure to give notice resulted 
only in the forfeiture of minor charges amounting to the cost of repos-
session, storage and disposition of the collateral.S If repossession could 
be effected without the use of force, the secured creditor could proceed 
non-judicially; otherwise, the collateral could be obtained only through 
judicial process.& No more than five days after repossession, the secured 
creditor was required to give notice to the debtor that the collateral 
had been repossessed, and the collateral had to be retained for fifteen 
days after repossession in order to allow the debtor an opportunity to 
redeem the goods.1o It was also necessary for the creditor to give the 
debtor notice of his intention to sell the collateral at least five days 
prior to sale.u Upon sale of the collateral, the debtor was entitled to 
any surplus received by the creditor12 and was, conversely, liable for any 
deficiency suffered by him.1a 
The new statute restricts the freedom of the secured creditor to re-
possess by placing limitations on those events which constitute an en-
forceable default and by mandating the formerly elective notice require-
ment prior to repossession. It also limits the availability of non-judicial 
repossession and eliminates the deficiency judgment in most consumer 
credit transactions. This comment will examine the major provisions of 
the new consumer repossession statute by specifically concentrating on 
the provisions relating to: (1) default, (2) notice of default, (3) reposses-
8 Since the provisions of G.L. c. 255, §§131, 13J; G.L. c. 255B, §§20A, 20B; and 
G.L c. 255D, 1§21, 22 are substantially identical, all references in this romment shall 
be to G.L. c. 255, 1§131, 13J but, unless otherwise noted, apply equally to G.L. c. 
255B, §120A, 20B, and G.L. c. 255D, §§21, 22. 
7 Acts of 1967, c. 822, §lll1(a). 
s Acts of 1967, c. 822, §lll1(c}(1)(2). 
9 Acts of 1967, c. 822, §lll1(a). 
10 Acts of 1967, c. 822, l§lll1(b), 13J(a). 
11 Acts of 1967, c. 822, §lll1(c). 
12 Acts of 1967, c. 822, §131(c)(4). 
18 Acts of 1967, c. 822, §lll1(d). In order to be entitled to a deficiency, a secured 
party had to file, on the return day of the action for a claimed deficiency, an affidavit, 
signed by either the purchaser at the sale, or by himself, stating the price of the 
goods. at the sale as well as the date and place of the sale. Acts of 1967, c. 822, §131(d). 
In th1s regard, see Acts of 197!1, c. 1114, §326, quoted in note liS infra. 
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sion, and (4) redemption and deficiency judgment. In the area of re-
possession, additional consideration will be given to recent judicial 
decisions and their effect upon the ability of creditors to obtain posses-
sion of the collateral upon default in satisfaction of the obligations of 
the debtor. 
I. DEFAULT 
The provisions of a security agreement which enumerate those events 
constituting a default by the debtor are obviously of primary importance 
to a consideration of repossession since the occurrence of a default is a 
condition precedent to the allowance of repossession by the creditor.u 
In Massachusetts, under the former chapter 255, those events which 
could give rise to a default were strictly a matter of agreement between 
the parties.111 A secured creditor could "repossess consumer goods subject 
to a security interest when the debtor [was] in a default under a security 
agreement."16 
The new statute restricts the creditor's freedom to repossess in con-
sumer transactions by providing that 
a provision relating to default is enforceable only to the extent that 
the default is material and consists of the debtor's failure to make 
one or more payments as required by the agreement, or the occur-
rence of an event which substantially impairs the value of the 
collateral.17 
While the parties to the agreement continue to define default under 
the new law, the default provisions are now subject to judicial scrutiny. 
The requirement of materiality will serve to limit contractual default 
provisions, ensuring that the failure of the debtor to perform some 
trivial act will not justify repossession of the collateral; it will also pro-
vide minimum standards for determining whether repossession is war-
ranted in the absence of specific contractual default provisions. Signifi-
cantly, the failure to make one or more payments is not, by itself, 
presumed to constitute an enforceable default, even when the agreement 
so provides, unless such failure is determined to be "material." 
14 See generally G.L. c. 106, §§9-503 to 9-505; R. Summers & J. White, Handbook 
of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code §26-2 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 
Summers & White]. 
111 Massachusetts was not untypical in this respect. See, e.g., Whisenhunt v. Allen 
Parker Co., 119 Ga. App. 813, 818, 168 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1969). Commentators have 
also recognized the deference given to the parties' agreement. See, e.g., Summers & 
White, supra note 14, §26-2 n.6; Hogan, The Secured :Party and Default Proceedings 
under the U.C.C., 47 Minn. L. Rev. 205, 209 (1962). 
16 Acts of 1967, c. 822, §13I(a) (emphasis added). 
17 G.L. c. 255, §13I(a) (emphasis added). 
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The requirement that a default must be "material" or "substantially 
impair the value of the collateral" in order to be enforceable could be 
of particular value to the consumer-debtor bound by a:n adhesion con-
tract drafted by the creditor and favoring the creditor's interests.18 
Uncertainty as to what constitutes an enforceable default, however, 
could cause initial problems for creditors attempting to determine an 
appropriate course of action. It is quite possible that, since "[t]here is 
no simple test to ascertain whether a breach is material,"19 and since 
the question of whether an event substantially impairs the value of the 
collateral should be a question of fact for the jury, these provisions will 
produce substantial litigation. 
It is probable that much of this anticipated litigation and uncertainty 
could have been avoided had the Legislature included in the Act specific 
default provisions, perhaps similar to those found in the National Con-
sumer Act (NCA)20 or the Model Consumer Credit Act (MCCA),21 
drafted by the National Consumer Law Center. While the default pro-
18 The realities underlying the typical standard-form mntract, in which creditors 
can dictate their terms to mnsumers who accept out of emnomic necessity, have 
been remgnized by murts as well as by m~entators. See, e.g., Swarb v. Lennox, 
!114 F. Supp. 1091; 1099 nn.19·22 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 Harv. 
L. Rev. 700 (19!19). · 
19 J. Calamari 8c J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts §157 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 
Calamari 8c Perillo] citing 4 A. Corbin, Contracts §§945-46 (1951), liA A. Corbin, 
Contracts §§700-12 (1951), and 6 S. Williston, Contracts §1812-86 (19!18). See also 
Restatement (Semnd) of Contracts §266 mmment a (Tent. Draft No. 8, 197!1); General 
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Kyle, !151 P.2d 768 (Cal. 1960). 
20 Section 5.10!1 of the NCA provides: 
(1) "Default" with respect to a mnsumer credit transaction means the failure 
without justification under any provision of law of the mnsumer to pay: 
(a) three successive installments within the period of time allowable by this Act, 
or 
(b) any remaining balance within three months after the due date of the final 
installment, or 
(c) an amount resulting from the total of unpaid delinquent installments mn-
stituting !10% of the amount financed. 
21 Section 7.102(1) of the MCCA provides: 
(1) "Default" with respect to a mnsumer credit transaction other than one pur-
suant to an open end credit plan means that the mnsumer, without justification 
pursuant to any provision of law, has remaining unpaid 
(a) if the transaction is scheduled to be paid in full in six (6) or fewer instal-
ments, any two (2) or more delinquent instalments the total amount of which 
is equal to more than fifteen (15) per cent of the transaction total, or any re-
maining balance within two (2) months after the due date of the final instalment, 
or 
(b) if the transaction is scheduled to be paid in full in more than six (6) in-
stalments, any delinquent instalment or instalments the total amount of which 
is equal to more than fifteen (15) per cent of the transaction total, or any re-
maining balance within three (ll) months after the due date of the final instalment 
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visions in these model acts could certainly have provided helpful guid-
ance for both courts and creditors attempting to determine the materiality 
of a debtor's failure to make a payment or payments, it would appear 
that the Legislature was reluctant to restrict the concept of default to 
such a precise definition. It will, therefore, rest with the courts to 
develop useful guidelines as to what is "material" or "substantially 
impairs the value of the collateral." Judicial determination of material-
ity, which is founded upon the facts of each particular situation,22 will, 
it is submitted, be more appropriate than strictly defined legislative 
tests since the fairness inherent in the flexibility of the judicial process 
far outweighs the rigorous certainty of specific tests_ 
The addition of the materiality requirement allows a helpful analogy 
to be drawn between the concepts of material default and total breach 
of contract, since in either case the usual result is the termination of 
the agreement.23 A total breach of contract has been defined as "a non-
performance of duty that is so material and important as to justify the 
injured party in regarding the whole transaction as at an end."24 Simi-
larly, a material default, by giving rise to the right of the creditor to 
repossess the collateral, can effectively terminate the contract. A number 
of factors utilized by the courts in determining whether a breach of 
contract is total or partial may be useful in providing guidance to 
courts and creditors attempting to determine the materiality of a default 
in a consumer transaction. First, the extent to which the debtor has 
performed his obligations under the contract at the time of the breach 
should be considered in determining whether the present breach is 
"material."25 In the interest of fairness, a breach by a party who has 
substantially performed his obligations under the contract should be 
considered less serious than a breach at the outset.26 Second, the likeli-
hood that the breaching party will cure his default and perform the 
remainder of the contract should be a significant consideration in deter-
mining the materiality of the breach.21 In this regard, prior defaults, 
either under this contract or other contracts, are relevant considerations. 
In fact, the creditor is required by chapter 255 to provide the debtor 
with notice of and an opportunity to cure his default prior to the initia-
tion of any action against the debtor; however, the creditor is not ob-
ligated to give notice when "the debtor has cured a default after notice 
three or more times."2B Third, the reasons, if any, for the default are 
particularly significant considerations in determining the materiality of 
22 See Calamari 8c Perillo, supra note 19, §157 n.3. 
23 See Comment, 11 B.C. Ind. 8c Com. L. Rev. 435, 438-39 (1970). 
24 4 A. Corbin, Contracts §946 (1951). 
25 Restatement of Contracts, §275(c) (1932). 
26 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §266 Comment d (Tent. Draft No.8, 1973). 
27 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §266(d) (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1973). 
28 G.L. c. 255, §13/(b). 
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a default in a consumer transaction.29 Over the course of a multi-year 
installment contract, it is possible that a temporary setback could render 
the consumer unable to meet a number of payments. The extent to which 
the consumer's failure to perform his obligations is a result of circum-
stances beyond his control should thus be a significant factor in deter-
mining whether the breach is material. Fourth, the extent to which the 
creditor is injured by the failure of the consumer to perform and the 
extent to which that injury can be remedied by the resumption of the 
contract payments and the payment of actual damages is relevant to a 
determination of materiality.8o It does not seem unrealistic to assume 
that in the normal consumer credit transaction any injury to the creditor 
could be compensated by the payment of a minor charge by the con-
sumer. Certainly, where the consumer is willing to continue with the 
agreement, this option is preferable to the termination of the contract 
and repossession of the collateral. Finally, the extent to which the con-
sumer will suffer hardship by a determination that the default is ma-
terial and the resultant termination of the contract should be considered, 
especially in combination with the other factors enumerated above.81 
It is submitted that whether an event substantially impairs the value 
of the collateral should be a question of fact for the jury. In an analogous 
situation, under section 2-612(3) of the UCC,82 a buyer in an installment 
contract may treat a non-conforming installment which "substantially 
impairs the value of the whole contract" as a total breach. Ascertaining 
when a non-conforming installment substantially impairs the value of the 
whole, however, is a difficult question which will frequently be deter-
mined by the jury,8a Similarly, it would seem reasonable to submit the 
question of substantial impairment in consumer transactions to the jury 
for determination. 
While any failure to perform according to the terms of the agreement 
may be a breach for which the secured creditor will have a claim for 
damages,3* only a determination that the breach is material or substan-
tially impairs the value of the collateral will terminate the contract and 
give rise to the creditor's right to repossess.811 It would seem inequitable 
to allow the creditor to make such a determination in a situation where his 
personal interest is likely to inhibit his ability to objectively evaluate 
29 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §266(e) (Tent. Draft No.8, 1973). 
30 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §266(b) (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1973). 
81 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §266(c) (Tent. Draft No.8, 1973). 
32 G.L. c. 106, §2-612(3) provides in relevant part that "[w)henever non-conformity 
or default with respect to one or more installments substantially impairs the value of 
the whole contract there is a breach of the whole." 
33 See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 19, §160 n.60. 
84 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§261, 266 comment a, 268 (Tent. Draft No. 
8, 1973). 
811 Calamari & Perillo, supra note 19, §§149, 157. 
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the seriousness of the default. Yet, the new statute continues to allow 
the creditor to determine his own rights and execute his own remedies.86 
While a creditor who errs in such determination or execution would 
certainly be subject to liability,37 it is submitted that the inclusion of 
the materiality and substantial impairment requirements is incompatible 
with the retention of non-judicial repossession. In order for these re-
quirements to be truly meaningful, the creditor should be required to 
proceed judicially and should not be permitted to determine his own 
rights. 
II. NoncE oF DEFAULT 
Once a default has occurred, chapter 255 requires the creditor to pro-
vide the debtor with written notice of the default and an opportunity 
to cure such default prior to repossession or action on the debt.8S Notice 
se G.L c. 255, §13J(a). 
37 See, e.g., Whisenhunt v. Allen Parker Co., 119 Ga. App. 813, 168 S.E.2d 827 
(1969); Morris v. First Nat'l Bank &: Trust Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 254 N.E.2d 683 
(1970); Stone Machinery Co. v. Kessler, I Wash. App. 750, 463 P.2d 651 (1970). 
It should also be noted that wrongful repossession may subject the creditor to 
liability under G.L. c. 106, §9-507. 
88 G.L. c. 255, §§13I(b), (c) and (d). 
Section 13I(d) of chapter 255, as amended by §l(d) of chapter 629 of the Acts 
of 1973, provides: 
(d) During the twenty-one day period after delivery of the notice required by 
this section the creditor may not because of that default accelerate the unpaid 
balance of the obligation, bring action against the debtor or proceed against 
the collateral. 
Apparently through inadvertence, the Legislature later rewrote §13I(d) of chapter 
255 in §!126 of chapter 1114 of the Acts of 1973 to provide: 
(d) No court shall enter a deficiency judgment against a debtor which includes 
a finance charge or insurance premiums allocable to instalments due after re-
possession. A debtor whose goods have been repossessed shall not be liable in 
a civil action for a deficiency unless the secured party files an affidavit signed 
either by the purchaser at the sale or by the secured party stating the price 
for which the goods were sold and the date and place of sale. Such affidavit 
shall be filed by the return day if the action is brought in the district court. 
It shall be filed with the complaint if the action is brought in the superior court. 
Technically, §326 of chapter 1114, since it was enacted on November 30, 197!1, 
will, as of July 1, 1974, repeal and replace §l(d) of chapter 629, which was enacted 
on August 14, 1973. However, the later act was intended to improve the procedure 
in civil trials and appeals, whereas the earlier act was designed to effect substantive 
changes in creditor's remedies upon default in consumer transactions. Moreover, the 
later act did not refer to the earlier 1973 legislation but rather it stated that 
"Section 131 of Chapter 255 of the General Laws, is hereby amended by striking 
out paragraph (d), as appearing in chapter 822 of the acts of 1967, and inserting 
in place thereof the following paragraph • , ." (emphasis added). The subject 
matter of the later act bears no relevance to the subject matter of · §l(d) of 
chapter 629, however, it would be relevant to the procedures prescribed in chap-
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of the default cannot be mailed or delivered to the debtor until ten days 
after default,8D and such notice must allow the debtor at least twenty-one 
days in which to cure.~ During this "notice period," and thereafter until 
the creditor either brings an action on the debt, proceeds against the 
collateral or notifies the debtor of his intention to accelerate the unpaid 
balance of the obligation, the debtor may cure his default by payment 
of the amount currently owing at the time of the default, without ac-
celeratio:q.41 Such payment will "restore the debtor to his rights under 
the agreement as though the [default had] not occurred •... "42 
Through the establishment of this notice requirement and the pro-
scription of acceleration during the notice period, the Legislature has 
in essence stated that, at a minimum, a thirty-one day delay in perfor-
mance will be treated as a partial breach. Such treatment is of great 
value to the consumer, since, if a delay in performance enabled the 
creditor to accelerate the unpaid balance of the obligation, such delay 
would almost inevitably result in termination of the contract and re-
possession of the collateral. This would be the case because a consumer 
who experienced difficulty in making timely payment would certainly 
find it impossible to pay such a large sum at one time. 
III. REPoss~IoN 
The failure of the debtor to cure his default within the notice period 
triggers the creditor's right to repossess the collateral under the new 
ter 822 of the Acts of 1967. It would appear, therefore, that the later act was 
drafted without knowledge of the amendments contained in chapter 629 of the 
Acts of 197!1 and was not intended to affect the provisions of chapter 629. It is 
submitted that curative legislation should be enacted to incorporate both §l(d) 
of chapter 629 of the Acts of 197!1 and §!126 of chapter 1114, of the Acts of 197!1 in 
chapter 255 of the General Laws. Until such curative legislation is enacted, the courts 
should interpret both of these sections as effective and should not allow an oversight 
to destroy the clear intent of the Legislature. 
In the alternative, if the courts hold that the later act does invalidate G.L c. 255, 
§l!II(d), the protection which would have been provided by §l!II(d) may still be implied 
from the provisions of G.L c. 255, §ll!II(b) and (c) which state in relevant part: 
(b) After a default under a consumer credit transaction by a debtor the secured 
creditor may not bring an action against the debtor or proceed against the col· 
lateral until he gives the debtor the notice required by this section. • • • 
(c) ••• If you do not cure your default by the date stated above, {date which 
is at least twenty-one days after notice is mailed] the said creditor may sue you 
to obtain a judgment for the amount of the debt or may take possession of the 
collateral. , , 
89 G.L c. 255, §l!II(c). 
40 G.L c. 255, §l!II(c). 
41 G.L. c. 255, l§l!II(d) and (e). 
However, if the debtor cures his default after the twenty-one day notice period, but 
prior to any creditor action or notice of acceleration, he must pay any delinquency 
or deferral charges in addition to the amount due. G.L. c. 255, §l!II(e). 
42 G.L c. 255, §l!II(e). See also G.L c. 255, §l!II(c). 
58
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 13
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1973/iss1/13
§10.16 COMMERCIAL LAW 295 
statute. Chapter 255 provides for non-judicial as well as judicially au-
thorized repossession; however, under both of these procedures the actual 
repossession is effected by the creditor without the assistance of state 
agents. Recent judicial decisions have rendered unenforceable the Massa-
chusetts replevin procedure43 under which the creditor could obtain, 
upon ex parte application, a writ of replevin directing state officers to 
seize property in possession of the defendant. Similarly, the validity of 
non-judicial (self-help) repossession has been called into question in 
Massachusetts by the decision of the United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts in Boland v. Essex County Bank and Trust 
Company.44 
The next section of this comment will briefly discuss the status of the 
Massachusetts replevin procedure. This discussion will lead to an exam-
ination of the procedures for non-judicial and judicially authorized re-
possession under chapter 255 and a consideration of the vitality of these 
procedures in light of recent judicial decisions. 
A. Replevin 
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,45 the United States Supreme 
Court46 held that the due process requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment were not satisfied by a Wisconsin wage garnishment stat-
ute,47 which allowed a creditor to secure attachment of a debtor's wages 
prior to notice and an opportunity to be heard on the underlying claim. 
The emphasis of the Court in Sniadach on the fact that the debtors 
in that case had been deprived of necessities of life4s left some doubt 
as to whether that decision would be construed narrowly and restricted 
to its facts, or applied broadly to stand for the proposition that, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, an individual has a right to be heard before 
he may be deprived by operation of law of any property interest. 
The decision in Sniadach was extended and somewhat clarified in 
Fuentes v. Shevin,4D where the Court found that the replevin statutes of 
Florida and Pennsylvania were violative of the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment since they did not provide debtors with notice 
and a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to the seizure by state 
agents of property in the debtor's possession. The Court in Fuentes held 
that the due process rights of notice and hearing protected "any signifi-
43 G.L. c. 247. 
44 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973). 
411 395 u.s. 337 (1969). 
46 395 U.S. at 342. 
47 Wis. Stat. §267.18(2)(a), c. 507, §1 (1965), as amended in Wis. Stat. §267.18(2) 
(Supp. 1972). 
48 395 U.S. at 340-42. 
49 ~7 u.s. 67 (1972). 
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cant property interest" including an interest in continued possession and 
use of goods under a conditional sales agreement, despite debtor's lack 
of full legal title.5o 
The Massachusetts replevin statute is similar to the replevin statutes of 
Florida and Pennsylvania in that it does not provide debtors with notice 
or an opportunity for a hearing prior to issuance of the writ of replevin 
and seizure of debtor's property.51 Recognizing that, in light of Fuentes, 
the Massachusetts procedure was constitutionally deficient, Chief Justice 
Flaschner of the District Courts52 of Massachusetts immediately issued 
an order stating: 
[As a result of the Fuentes decision] it would appear that the re-
plevin procedure set forth in Sections 7 and 8 of Chapter 24 7 is 
unconstitutional. Until the General Court enacts a curative amend-
ment, or possibly the SJC promulgates an emergency rule, replevin 
plaintiffs will have to become petitioners in equity.58 
Since neither the Legislature nor the Supreme Judicial Court has taken 
any action designed to cure the defective replevin procedure, it remains, 
at the present time, an inoperative statute. 
B. Non-judicial Repossession 
The right of a secured creditor to retake collateral upon default with-
out resort to judicial process, as long as such retaking can be accom-
plished peaceably, has long been recognized in the common law.54 The 
Uniform Conditional Sales Act statutorily authorized non-judicial re-
possession where the collateral could be retaken without a breach of the 
peace55 and such authorization has been continued in the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), as adopted in Massachusetts.!!& 
r;o Id. at 86. 
51 G.L. c. 247, §§7, 8. 
52 Original jurisdiction of actions in replevin is vested in the Massachusetts district 
courts by G.L. c. 218, §19. 
53 District Courts of Massachusetts, Bulletin No. 2-72, Item 9 ijuly 11, 1972). 
54 See Annot., 36 A.L.R. 853 (1925); 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries •4. 
55 Section 16 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act provides: 
When the buyer shall be in default in the payment of any sum due under the 
contract, or in the performance of any other condition which the contract requires 
him to perform in order to obtain the property in the goods, or in the per-
formance of any promise the breach of which is by the contract expressly made 
a ground for the retaking of the goods, the seller may retake possession thereof. 
Unless the goods can be retaken without breach of the peace, they shall be re-
taken by legal process; but nothing herein shall be construed to authorize a 
violation of the criminal law. 
56 G.L. c. 106, §9-503 provides in pertinent part: 
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take 
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed 
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The UCC, however, does not define breach of the peace, and courts, 
as a result, have disagreed as to what constitutes a breach of the peace 
in the context of repossession.111 This divergence of opinion has created 
some uncertainty about the permissible scope of creditor action in effect-
ing repossession. Most courts, it appears, have accepted the definition 
formulated in the criminal law that an act constitutes a breach of the 
peace if it "unreasonably disturbs the public peace and tranquility, or 
tends strongly to cause such a disturbance .... "118 Some courts, however, 
have found a breach of the peace in a commercial setting when the 
creditor commits a simple trespass or obtains the collateral through 
"fraud, deception, trick or artifice."ll9 
Under the former chapter 255, Massachusetts adhered to the majority 
view, permitting non-judicial repossession in consumer credit transac-
tions where the collateral could be obtained "without the use of force."80 
The new statute, however, severely limits the availability of non-judicial 
repossession by restricting its use to those situations in which the re-
possession can be effected "without use of force, without a breach of 
peace and, unless the debtor consents to an entry, at the time of such 
entry, without entry upon property owned by, or rented to the debtor."61 
The extent to which non-judicial repossession will be limited by the new 
statute is in large part dependent upon judicial interpretation of the 
consent requirement. While it is clear that consent cannot be obtained 
in advance of the time of repossession and that the consent need not be 
in writing, it is unclear whether affirmative consent is mandated by the 
statute or whether passive acquiescence by the debtor is sufficient to satisfy 
the consent requirement.62 It is submitted that the statute is best read as 
requiring affirmative consent, given voluntarily, intelligently and. know-
ingly by the debtor. Such a construction would minimize the possibility· 
that the debtor would succumb to the subtle intimidation inherent in 
the situation where he is confronted by a creditor demanding payment, 
and would be in accord with the meaning of express consentea as it is 
commonly used in the law. 
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may 
proceed by ·action. 
117 See Comment, 11 B.C. Ind. Be Com. L. Rev. 4!15, 440-49 (1970) for an analysis 
of the divergent views on the breach of the peace limitation in non-judicial repos-
session. See also Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d !158 (1965). 
118 R. Perkins. Criminal Law 400-01 (2d ed. 1969). See, e.g., Cherno v. Bank of 
Babylon, 54 Misc. 2d 277, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114, aff'd, 29 A.D.2d 767, 288 N.Y.S.2d 862 
(1968). 
119 See, e.g., Md:arty-Greene Motor Co. v. House, 216 Ala. 666, 667, 114 So. 2d 60, 62 
(1927); Malone v. Darr, 178 Okla. 44!1, 446, 62 P.2d 1254, 1257 (19!16). 
60 Acts of 1967, c. 822, §1!1/(a). 
61 G.L. c. 255, §l!IJ(a) (emphasis added). 
62 See Queenan, The New Consumer Repossession Law, 58 Mass. Law. Q. 412, 414 
(197!1). 
68 Express consent has been defined as "[t]hat directly given, either viva voce or in 
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The inability of the creditor to. enter property owned by or rented to 
the debtor without consent will have a marked effect upon the useful-
ness of non-judicial repossession. Automobiles, which have been the most 
frequently repossessed collateral because of their availability for non-
judicial repossession and their substantial resale market, will now be 
difficult to seize non-judicially. As one commentator has noted: 
[t]here is no reason to think that the courts will treat a car reposses-
sor's unconsented to entry into the debtor's garage or onto his drive-
way as being beyond the statute's scope. And even the driveway of 
a multi-family building in which the debtor rents an apartment may 
well be treated as property "rented to the debtor." This should be 
the result under the doctrine that a lease transfers to the lessee 
not only the right to exclusive possession of the demised premises 
but also, by implication, an appurtenant easement for certain 
necessary uses. The statute may also protect a defaulting car owner 
who has the exclusive right to an assigned space in a public parking 
lot or public garage. Such an arrangement can be construed as a lease 
rather than license.a' 
Apparently, however, in circumstances presenting no immediate threat 
of violence, the statute· would permit repossession from a public street 
or a public parking area, where the debtor has no assigned space. It is 
submitted that this situation could result in a form of tactical "brink-
manship" by encouraging creditors to keep debtors under constant sur-
veillance, awaiting an opportunity to effect the repossession when favor-
able circumstances arise. The determination of whether the creditor's 
conduct complied with the requirements of the statute would be made 
after the fact and would be dependent upon the accuracy of the repos-
sessor's judgment in the particular instance. 
Finally, it should be remembered that the creditor can proceed against 
the collateral without a prior hearing only when the default is "mate-
rial" or upon the "occurrence of an event which substantially impairs 
the value of the collateral."66 As noted previously, there is no absolute 
test to determine when a default is "material" and the question of 
whether an event "substantially impairs" the collateral should be one 
for the jury.66 While, over a period of time, judicial decisions may pro-
vide guidelines helpful in making these determinations, a secured credi-
tor desiring to repossess collateral without a prior hearing must first make 
a subjective determination of the materiality of a default for himself 
writing. It is positive, direct, unequivocal consent, requiring no inference or implica· 
tion for its meaning." Black's Law Dictionary 377 (Revised 4th ed. 1968). 
M 58 Mass. Law. Q. at 414 (citations omitted). 
65 See text at note 17 supra. 
66 See note 19 and text at notes 32-33 supra. 
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in each situation. The uncertainty involved in making such a determina-
tion, and the risk of possible liability if the repossession is later found 
to be unlawful,87 should induce the cautious creditor to proceed judi-
cially until sufficiently precise guidelines are formulated. At the very 
least, the secured creditor will be forced to balance the risk involved 
in proceeding non-judicially with the benefit to be gained by obtaining 
immediate possession of the collateral. 
C. Constitutional Challenges to Non-Judicial Repossession 
Non-judicial repossession has, in recent years, been the subject of 
numerous constitutional attacks alleging that the deprivation of a posses-
sory interest in secured collateral without notice or an opportunity to 
be heard on the underlying claim is violative of the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.68 While these attacks emanate from the 
rationale of the Sniadach and Fuentes cases, the extension of the due 
process rights enunciated in those cases to self-help procedures is, of 
course, dependent upon a finding of "state action" since the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantee of due process applies only where it is the action 
of a state which is being challenged constitutionally.69 Thus, the primary 
question presented by these challenges is whether the statutory authori-
zation of non-judicial repossession sufficiently involves the state in the 
retaking to constitute action taken under color of state law. A finding 
of state action would bring non-judicial repossession within the scope of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and would seem to compel a finding that 
such repossession constitutes a denial of due process. 70 
In Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust CompanyP the Federal 
District Court for the District of. Massachusetts joined the minority of 
courts which have considered the constitutionality of non-judicial re-
possession72 and which have found that the summary repossession au-
67 See note 37 supra. 
68 See, e.g., Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal 1972), rev'd mb nom. 
Adams v. Southern Cali[omia First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973): Gibbs 
v. Titelman, 13 U.C.C. R.ep. Serv. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, Nos. 74-1062 to 74-1067 
(3d Cir. Aug. 1, 1974). 
419 Tbe Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: [n]or shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law • . • . 
U.S. Canst. amend. XIV (emphasis added). 
70 See, e.g., Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
71 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973). 
72 At present, five circuit courts of appeals have considered the question of whether 
non-judicial repossession, as authQrized by section 9-503 of the UCC or analogous 
state statutes, constitutes action "under color of state law" and have uniformly con-
cluded that it does not. See Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974): 
Gibbs v. Titelman, Nos. 74-1062 to 74-1067 (3d Cir., filed Aug. 1, 1974): James v. 
Pinnix, No. 75-1866 (5th Cir., filed June 10, 1974); Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 
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thorized by section 9-503 of the UCC constituted action taken "under 
color of state law" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983.78 
Plaintiffs in that consolidated action had purchased automobiles from 
the defendant-automobile dealers under retail installment contracts which 
had been assigned to the defendant-sales finance companies. The sales 
finance companies had taken possession of the automobiles, upon default 
by the plaintiffs, without providing the plaintiffs with notice or an op-
portunity to be heard on the underlying claim. Plaintiffs brought suit 
under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that such summary repossession con-
stituted a deprivation of property in violation of their rights to due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court, rejecting defen-
dants' contention that the repossessions were not actions taken under 
color of state law, found sufficient state involvement in the repossessions 
to allow the plaintiffs to proceed with the merits of their case. While 
the court did not reach the issue of whether repossession without notice 
and an opportunity to be heard constitutes a denial of due process, 
it seems clear that, once state action is found, the application of the 
principles enunciated in Fuentes would require notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard prior to such taking.or• 
The continued vitality of the Boland case is questionable, however, 
since that decision clearly reflects the minority view and since the United 
States Supreme Court, which has indicated a retreat from Fuentes in the 
recent decision in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,orr. will ultimately resolve 
No. 73-1621 (8th Cir., filed May 13, 1974); Biebel Optical Laboratories, Inc. v. Mar-
quette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973); Adams v. Southern California. First 
Nat'l Bank, 492 :f:.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973). Additionally, the First Circuit found no 
"state action" in Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, No. 73-1372, 42 
U.S.L.W. 2601 (1st Cir., May 9, 1974), dealing with the analogous self-help remedy of 
bank set off. 
73 361 F. Supp. at 919-20. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970) provides: 
Every person who, under oolor of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress. 
Original jurisdiction for actions predicated upon 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970) is placed in 
the federal oourts by 28 U.S.C. §1343 (1970), which provides, in pertinent part: 
The district oourts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized 
by law to be oommenced by any person: 
(3) To redress the deprivation under oolor of any State law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the 
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal 
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. 
U See Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
73 - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974). 
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the issue. The final resolution of this question may, in any event, have 
little effect in Massachusetts since chapter 255 requires that notice and 
an opportunity to cure a default be given to the debtor prior to any 
creditor actions. Since Fuentes requires only an opportunity to be heard 
prior to repossession, it is possible that, even if the Boland case is fol-
lowed in the future, the "notice period" incorporated in chapter 255 
will be found to present such an opportunity and thus satisfy the re-
quirements of due process. 
D. Judicially Authorized Repossession 
A secured creditor who is either unable to effect non-judicial reposses-
sion or who desires to avoid the risks of proceeding non-judicially may, 
under chapter 255, have his right to the collateral determined at a 
hearing at which the debtor will have an opportunity to be heard.78 
Prior to the initiation of judicial action, the debtor must have received 
notice of his default and of his rights upon default, and he must have 
been allowed at least twenty-one days to cure his default.n Additionally, 
the creditor must provide the debtor with at least seven days notice of 
the hearing.7s 
While it is clear that expiration of the notice period is a condition 
precedent to a judicial determination of the creditor's right to repossess,79 
it is not clear whether notice of the hearing may be sent to the debtor 
during the twenty-one day notice period. The statute would seem to 
imply, however, that notice of the hearing cannot be sent prior to the 
expiration of the notice period.so Such a reading of the statute would be 
in accord with the underlying policy of the notice requirement, which is 
to provide the debtor with an opportunity to cure his default without 
any action on the part of the creditor. 
The creditor, in filing a petition for a hearing in the District Court 
of Massachusetts, must provide the court with 
76 G.L. c. 255, §lliJ(b). 
77 G.L. c. 255, §§llll(b), (c) and (d). 
78 G.L c. 255, §lliJ(b). 
'f9 G.L. c. 255, §llll(b) and (d). See also Rule 2liA of the District Courts of Massa-
chusetts which provides that 
[b]efore making a determination that the creditor has a right of repossession 
the court must be satisfied that the conditions of this Rule and the statutory 
conditions relative to the nature of the default, the notice of the default and all 
other statutory prerequisites have been met. 
Dist. Ct. Mass. R. 2liA, reprinted in 2 Mass. Lawyers' Weekly 186 (1974). 
80 G.L. c. 255, §l!ll(d). §llll(d) provides: "During the twenty-one day period after 
delivery of the notice required by this Section the creditor may not because of that 
default accelerate the unpaid balance of the obligation, bring action against the debtor, 
or proceed against the collateral." (Emphasis added). 
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(a) a description of the parties, of the property involved and the 
place where the property is believed to be located, (b) a detailed 
statement of facts upon which the creditor claims a right of repos-
session, including facts as to compliance with statutory prerequisites, 
and (c) a copy of the contract under which the claim of a right of 
repossession is made. 81 
This petition must be verified by the creditor, under oath, and, in the 
event the debtor does not challenge the creditor's claim, it will be the 
sole basis for determination of the creditor's right to repossess. The 
failure of the debtor to appear, however, will not result in an automatic 
judgment for the creditor since compliance with the statutory prerequi-
sites and the materiality of the default must, nevertheless, be sb.own.0 
Finally, it is important to note that under chapter 255 the court is 
asked to determine the right of the creditor to take possession of the 
collateral.B8 Unlike an action in replevin, which, if successful, entitles 
a creditor to have agents of the state seize the goods, the judicial repos-
session procedure set forth in chapter 629 merely allows the creditor to 
se~k the blessing of the court before he himself seizes the goods. 
IV. REDEMPTION, DISPosmoN, AND DEFICIENCY Juoo:MEN'I'S 
bnce the creditor has regained possession of the collateral, he must 
allow the debtor at least twenty days in which to redeem.s' The right 
of the debtor to redeem, however, is not automatically terminated upon 
expiration of the redemption period, but rather it continues until the 
creditor has either "disposed of the collateral, entered into a contract 
for its disposition, or gained the right to retain the collateral."B11 During 
the redemption period, the debtor may retrieve the goods by tendering 
the "full amount of the debt" in addition to any expenses :reasonably 
incurred by the creditor.se 
The existence of an acceleration clause will usually cause the "full 
amount of the debt" to be the equivalent of the entire unpaid balance, 
which is defined in the statute as "that amount which the debtor would 
have been required to pay upon prepayment."B'l Under section 9-506 of 
81 Dist. Ct. Mass. R. 23A, reprinted in 2 Mass. Lawyers' Weekly 186 (1974). 
82 Id: See note 79 supra. · 
88 G.L. c. 255, §ISJ(b) provides in pertinent part: "no rourt shall allow a secured 
creditor to ta1ce possession of collateral until the right of the creditor to take possession 
bas been determined at a hearing ••• " (emphasis added). See also DisL Ct. Mass. 
R. 23A and Admin. Reg. No. !1-74. 
Si G.L. c, 255, §l!IJ(c). 
811 G.L. c. 255, §l!IJ(c). 
86 G.L c. 255, §UI(c). 
81 G.L c. 255, §1!1J(d). 
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the UCC, which remains applicable because it is not displaced by chapter 
255,88 reasonable expenses include those incurred by the creditor "in 
retaking, holding and preparing the collateral for disposition, in arrang-
ing for the sale, and to the extent provided in the agreement and not 
prohibited by law, his reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses."89 
It would appear, therefore, that unless the default and repossession 
occur late in the term of the contract and the goods are still of consider-
able value, the debtor will often be unwilling to redeem. Moreover, it 
is likely that a debtor who has defaulted and failed to cure within the 
periOd provided by the statute will often be unable to redeem. However, 
this would not appear to work an undue hardship on debtors since the 
combination of a material breach with a failure to cure within the notice 
period would be indicative of either an inability to continue with the 
transaction or a lack of good faith on the part of the debtor. The failure 
of the debtor to redeem gives rise to the creditor's right to dispose of 
or retain the collateral as provided in the UCC.9o· The disposition of 
the collateral must be conducted in a commercially reasonable· manner91 
and the proceeds of the disposition must be applied in the order pre-
scribed by Section 9-504(1) of the UCC.92 
Chapter 255 does, however, effect a profound change in eliminating 
the deficiency judgment in consumer loans and automobile retail install-
ment contracts where the unpaid balance of the obligation is $2,000 or 
less at the time of repossession98 and in consumer installment sales 
88 G~. c. 255, §UJ(d) p~vides in part: 
Unless displaced by the provisions of this section and section thirteen I, the rights 
and obligations of the parties, including redemption and disposition of the ool-
lateral shall be governed by the provisions of Part 5 of Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
89 G.L c. 106, §9-506. 
90 G~. c. 106, 1§9-504 and 9-505 prescribe the procedure for disposition of the 
oollateral by the creditor. These sections apply under chapter 255 by virtue of G.L. 
c. 255J(d). 
91 G.L. c. 106, §9-504(3). 
92 G.L. c. 106, §9-504(1) provides in relevant part: 
(1) ••• The proceeds of disposition shall be applied in the order following to 
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale, selling 
and the like and, to the extent provided for in the agreement and not prohibited 
by law, the reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured 
party: 
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest under which 
the disposition is made: 
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate security interest 
in the oollateral if written notification of demand therefor is received before 
distribution of the proceeds is oompleted. If requested by the secured party, 
the holder of a subordinate security interest must seasonably furnish reasonable 
proof of his interest, and unless he does so, the secured party need not oomply 
with his demand. 
DB G.L. c. 255, §13J(d) and G.L. c. 255B, §20B(d). The statute is unclear as to 
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involving goods other than automobiles where the unpaid balance of 
the obligation is $1,000 or less at the time of repossession.'1' The debtor 
continues to be entitled to any surplus received by the creditor upon 
disposition of the collateral.811 Additionally, under the new statute, the 
fair market value of the collateral is presumed to be that value ascribed 
to the goods by "periodically published trade estimates."86 This presump-
tion will eliminate the practice of selling the collateral to a buyer related 
to the creditor for a price below that which could be obtained on the 
open market. The result of such a sale would be to decrease any surplus 
to which the debtor might be entitled, or increase any deficiency to 
which the creditor might be entitled, while, at the same time, increasing 
the profit acquired by the creditor upon resale. 
While chapter 255 will certainly aid the consumer who experiences 
difficulty with a credit transaction, the extent to which this Act will 
strengthen the consumer's position is dependent upon the interpretation 
given the Act's provisions by the courts. It is hoped that the courts will 
give full effect to the materiality and substantial impairment require-
ments in determining default, that the notice requirements and limita-
tions on non-judicial repossession will be strictly enforced, and that 
judicial determination of the existence of an enforceable default will 
be encouraged. Only through such interpretation will the protections 
which the statute provides for the consumer be truly meaningful. 
PHILIP E. MURRAY, JR. 
whether the debtor is liable for a deficiency when the unpaid balance of the obliga-
tion is exactly $2,000, providing in section l!IJ(d) that the debtor is not liable for 
any deficiency when the unpaid balance is $2,000 or less, .and providing in section 
UJ(e)(l) that the creditor is entitled to reoover a deficiency when the unpaid balance 
is $2,000 or more. 
8' G.L c. 255D, 122(d). The statute is unclear as to whether the debtor is liable 
for a deficiency when the unpaid balance of the obligation is exactly $1,000, providing 
in section 22(d) that the debtor is not liable for any deficiency when the unpaid 
balance is $1,000 or less, and providing in section 22(e)(l) that the creditor is en-
titled to reoover a deficiency when the unpaid balance is $1,000 or more. 
811 G.L c. 106, 19-504(2). 
88 G.L c. 255, §l!IJ(e)(2). 
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